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infrastructure may have stemmed from shared experience of many in senior leadership as 
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protecting a single facility against all threats and hazards. These findings can justify 
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A. ORIGIN OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The owner of a commercial office building can contact the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and request that a federal representative tour the building to 
identify vulnerabilities from terrorism. Information about the physical attributes of the 
facility is entered into a computer program to model risks along with high definition 
photographs of the exterior. To mitigate the risks from terrorist threats, DHS suggests 
strategies, such as adding fences, installing electronic access control devices, mounting 
additional closed circuit television cameras, or conducting random security screenings of 
visitors. DHS will also provide free training courses for the building’s security officers to 
learn about searching for improvised explosives, handling bomb threats, or identifying 
terrorists who are conducting surveillance.1 These services that DHS offers to privately 
owned commercial facilities (CF) fall under the department’s statutory critical 
infrastructure (CI) protection mission and extend to 77,069 locations designated as 
“critical infrastructure” in the United States.2 How does the recommendation that an 
office building surround itself with a higher fence align with the federal mission to 
protect “the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on 
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination 
thereof?”3 Are the federal resources being expended to provide security consultation to 
                                                 
1 “Protective Security Advisors,” June 23, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/protective-security-advisors.  
2 Office of Inspector General, Progress in Developing the National Asset Database (OIG-06-40) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2006), http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_ 
06-40_Jun06.pdf.  
3 “What is Critical Infrastructure?” August 26, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure. 
Department of Homeland Security. 
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individual infrastructure facilities helping to accomplish the DHS’s cornerstone4 mission 
of protecting the country from terrorist attacks?5 
B. INTRODUCTION 
The chapters of this thesis explore the ideas that not everything designated as 
critical meets the definition of criticality; the methodologies for evaluating infrastructure 
are not aligned to the threats from terrorism; when supposedly CI, especially CF, are 
damaged or destroyed, it turns out the facility was not critical after all; and the overall 
systems of essential-to-life infrastructure across the country are more resilient than the 
current methodologies presuppose. 
This research is a meta-analysis of government policies on infrastructure 
protection (IP) to address the question of how these facilities became designated as 
critical and if the scope of the current IP effort is inhibiting the department’s ability to 
accomplish the mission. This research is limited to the risk evaluation, vulnerability 
assessment, and protection of physical infrastructure facilities. Rather than simply 
restating problems with IP that have already been published by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service, this thesis intends to 
determine the origins of current CI protection policies and the underlying challenges in 
accomplishing the mission. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This research examines the federal IP policies that have been issued over the past 
35 years to determine the origin and evolution of the mission. Within these documents, a 
consensus can be drawn that the definition of the term “critical infrastructure” is the 
systems and assets that are nationally significant and the loss of which would result in 
debilitating consequences to the safety and security of the United States. The 10 
                                                 
4 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington, 




overarching CI policies6 released over the past 19 years consistently describe CI as being 
nationally significant, providing vital services, being part of an interconnected system, 
causing debilitating impacts if destroyed, and providing a service necessary to the health 
and safety of the general public.  
Based on the analysis within this thesis, infrastructure that lacks national 
significance, criticality, and interconnectedness to other infrastructure systems does not 
meet this definition. The protection strategies for CF presented in the 2010 NIPP Sector 
Specific Plan (SSP)—Commercial Facilities lack information about the continuation of 
essential-to-life services or protection of nationally significant facilities, which underpins 
the definitions of CI. As a result, the CF sector serves as an example of the misalignment 
between what is critical to the nation and what is currently designated as critical by DHS. 
The CF plan puts emphasis on resilience, openness, and profitability, which does not 
suggest that critical functions are being carried out or the loss of those functions would 
result in debilitating impacts to the nation.7 While resilience, openness, and profitability 
are positive business practices, it is ineffective for DHS to be writing plans about 
concepts that do not correspond to criticality, which is the underlying principle of the IP 
mission. 
This inefficiency creates a discrepancy between the federal policies that define CI 
and how DHS currently addresses its statutory IP mission to identify, prioritize, and 
protect the nation’s most vital infrastructure.8 
                                                 
6 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, NIPP, PPD-21, Exec. Order No. 13636, NIPP, National 
Security Strategy, HSPD-7, USA PATRIOT Act, PDD/NSC-63, and Exec. Order No. 13010. 
7 Department of Homeland Security, Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan an Annex to the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2010 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2010), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-commercial-facilities-2010.pdf. 
8 The White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Washington, DC: 
The White House, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-
directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil.  
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D. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT DHS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
POLICIES 
This research summarizes the concrete shortfalls with IP that have been 
documented by other sources including the GAO. A problem with the current policies is 
that many of the 77,069 facilities do not meet the consensus definition identified in the 
literature review but are still considered to be “critical infrastructure.” The origin of this 
issue may have stemmed from the early directive for the newly formed DHS to develop a 
list of all of the critical facilities across the country.9 This thesis explores the challenges 
from the creation of the National Asset Database (NADB) and the mandate to develop a 
centralized list of facilities. The problems with the creation of the list were likely 
compounded by the need to rely on individual facilities to self-assess, and subsequently, 
overestimate risk. Within this research, the DHS CI chemical sector serves as an example 
of the challenges that occur with identifying and assessing critical facilities despite 
spending hundreds of millions of dollars and still resulting in an undetermined reduction 
in the risk from terrorism. 
E. SOURCES OF THE PROBLEM 
This research also examines theoretical explanations for the challenges with 
accomplishing the current CI protection mission. Modern military theories provide a 
potential explanation for the focus of DHS’s efforts because the threats from terrorism 
have likely been evaluated based on the education and experience of senior officials with 
principles of strategic warfare. 
Nationally significant infrastructure facilities that can cripple the essential 
functions of the entire country would be attractive targets for an enemy nation-state to 
strike with ballistic missile and airpower capabilities during a war. The current terrorist 
threat comes from homegrown violent extremist and members of terrorist groups who are 
                                                 
9 United States Congress, Committee Reports 109th Congress (2005–2006) House Report 109-713—
Part 1 (Washington, DC: United States Congress, 2007), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&sid= 
cp109alJsu&r_n=hr713p1.109&dbname=cp109&&sel=TOC_192496&. 
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motivated to inflict mass casualties in the locations most visible and easily accessible.10 
An individual terrorist or a small group of terrorists most likely lack the intelligence, 
organizational coordination, manpower, and resources to conduct a strategic warfare 
campaign against nationally significant infrastructure targets with the intent of crippling 
essential-to-life systems across the country. The strategic warfare approach of developing 
a static list of vulnerable assets does not match the unpredictable and dynamic threat from 
terrorism. The current IP policies identify the likely targets of a nation-state army and 
assume them to be the same targets that terrorists would have the intention and capability 
of attacking.  
F. CASE STUDIES OF THE DESTRUCTION OF CRITICAL FACILITIES 
The concept of protecting CI could altogether be a wasted effort because when 
supposedly CI is destroyed, the impacts are often negligible, or in some cases, even 
results in economic gains. It should be noted that the loss of human lives can occur with 
the destruction of critical facilities but the IP mission is not always focused on reducing 
human loses. In 2013, 32,719 traffic collision fatalities occurred on roadways11 that fall 
under the CI transportation systems sector but it is the mission of DHS to protect the 
physical transportation infrastructure from terrorist attacks rather than investing resources 
to prevent thousands of annual deaths from occurring during vehicle accidents on the 
highways.12 It is within the scope of the DHS mission to assess how a bridge could be 
attacked with explosives by terrorists but not to assess if installing higher guardrails 
could prevent a car from accidently driving off the bridge. 
Even when terrorists do successfully strike, the consequences may be more 
complex than making a blanket assumption that all CI facilities should be protected under 
all circumstances. Case studies of the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Las Vegas 
                                                 
10 “Countering Violent Extremism,” July 20, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/topic/countering-violent-
extremism.  
11 National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts 2013 Data 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 2015), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/ 
812181.pdf. 
12 “Transportation Systems Sector,” March 25, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/transportation-systems-
sector.  
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Strip casinos challenge the general assertion that negative economic consequences always 
result from the destruction of a “critical” facility. A case study of the 2014 toxic chemical 
spill into the primary water source serving Charleston, WV provides an example that is 
contrary to the assumption that the loss of a facility serving as a sole provider of an 
essential-to-life service results in cascading, debilitating impacts across all infrastructure 
sectors. The destruction of supposedly critical facilities has demonstrated that greater 
resilience does occur across infrastructure systems than DHS generally assumes. Instead 
of focusing protection efforts on potential losses, greater value may be found in 
understanding existing resiliency.   
While it was unforeseeable at the time, the Lower Manhattan area that was most 
heavily impacted by the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks is more valuable today and 
better positioned for the future than it was prior to 2001. If terrorists cannot cripple this  
nation by toppling 100-story commercial high-rise buildings, what kinds of facilities 
would have a debilitating impact on the entire nation if they were destroyed? Instead of 
being designated “critical,” the majority of infrastructure facilities are insignificant to the 
functions of the overall system because the loss of these facilities does not cause 
widespread disruptions to the nation, region, or even the local area. The worst 
circumstances may spur the greatest opportunity for positive change, which could shift 
homeland security strategies to focus primarily on effective recovery rather than 
protecting existing systems. 
G. AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY  
A solution for accomplishing the task of effectively identifying, prioritizing, and 
protecting CI is refining the criteria for how facilities are determined to be critical. A 
lower number of critical facilities will reduce the overall scope of the protection mission. 
To identify facilities more effectively that are CI, DHS should consider using a risk-based 
approach within a more narrow definition of the term that can be modeled after best 
practices from the United Kingdom (UK). The United Kingdom uses the designation of 
“national infrastructure” to emphasize the scope of the mission, which is focused 
exclusively on the systems that the entire country is dependent on for daily life. For an 
 xxiii
infrastructure asset to be considered a national priority, both a high level of criticality and 
a high likelihood of something negative occurring must exist. Adopting a risk-based 
approach for both the prioritization of facilities through the likelihood of destruction and 
evaluation of national impacts can assist DHS in more effectively designating facilities as 
“critical.”  
H. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The evidence presented within this thesis argues that DHS is not fulfilling the 
mission of protecting the infrastructure that is critical to the nation by expending 
resources on misaligned efforts at thousands of insignificant facilities. These problems 
are rooted in the current scope of the infrastructure mission being too large but is further 
complicated because the types of facilities designated as critical may not be the likely 
targets of terrorists. The few facilities that are critical to the nation are most likely too 
large, too remote, or too secure for a terrorist group to destroy, or to have an interest in 
targeting.  
On a local and regional level, redundancy and resiliency occur across 
infrastructure systems allowing affected areas to absorb outages and unaffected areas to 
provide alternative services. As a backstop, national emergency response capabilities can 
quickly deliver essential services during outages, such as the bottled water supplied to 
Charleston, WV following the chemical spill into the water supply. Also, enormous 
complexity within infrastructure systems makes predicting the impacts of outages 
extremely difficult, as demonstrated by the unanticipated economic gains in Lower 
Manhattan following the 9/11 attacks. 
Based on this thesis, DHS should ensure that everything designated as “critical” 
meets the definition of criticality, that the methodologies used for evaluating 
infrastructure align to the mission of protecting the nation for terrorism, and that 
protection efforts account for the existing resiliency within the systems that provide 
essential-to-life infrastructure across the country. 
 xxiv




Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but 
they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, 
but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve. 
— President George W. Bush, September 11, 20011 
 
The literal foundations of the United States are the CI systems that provide 
essential-to-life services on which the American people are dependent. These CI systems 
are “so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a 
debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination thereof.”2 Even after the Twin Towers fell, America remained 
capable of functioning, and President Bush said that night, “the functions of our 
government continue without interruption…our financial institutions remain strong, and 
the American economy will be open for business, as well.”3  
The terrorist attack had shattered steel but was unable to dent an enormously 
complex and resilient national system of infrastructure facilities. If terrorists cannot 
cripple this nation (even on the local level) by toppling 100-story commercial high-rise 
buildings, what kinds of facilities would have a debilitating impact on the entire nation if 
they were destroyed?  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis explores the questions of what infrastructure is critical to the nation 
and if current IP efforts are aligned to protecting the most critical facilities. The research 
also addresses the questions of if terrorists are likely to target CI facilities and if the 
overall concept of protecting infrastructure is actually an unnecessary effort.  
                                                 
1 “Statement by President George W. Bush in His Address to the Nation,” September 11, 2001, 
http://www.911memorial.org/sites/all/files/Statement.  
2 “What is Critical Infrastructure?” August 26, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure.  
3 “Statement by President George W. Bush in His Address to the Nation.” 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The chapters of this thesis explore the ideas that not everything designated as 
critical meets the definition of criticality. The methodologies for evaluating infrastructure 
are not aligned to evaluating the threats from terrorism. When supposedly CI, especially 
CF, is damaged or destroyed, it turns out that these facilities were not critical after all. 
Finally, the overall systems of essential-to-life infrastructure across the country are more 
resilient than the current methodologies presuppose. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a statutory mission to protect 
CI4 and the National Strategy for Homeland Security states,  
devastation of even one sector of our critical infrastructure or key 
resources would have a debilitating effect on our national security. 
Ensuring the survivability of our critical infrastructure assets, systems, and 
networks requires that we continue to accurately model their 
interdependencies and better understand the potential cascading effects 
that could impact or impede operations in interconnected infrastructures.5  
Continuously monitoring and analyzing interdependencies within interconnected 
infrastructure systems is a difficult task. The analysis within this thesis provides 
justification for reducing the size of the mission to focus on a smaller number of critical 
facilities. 
C. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
This research is a meta-analysis of government policies on IP to address the 
question of how these facilities became designated as critical and if the scope of the 
current IP effort is inhibiting the department’s ability to accomplish the mission. This 
research is limited to the risk evaluation, vulnerability assessment, and protection of 
physical infrastructure facilities. Rather than simply restating problems with IP that have 
already been published by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and 
                                                 
4 The White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Washington, DC: 
The White House, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-
directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
5 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 2007), 27, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007.pdf.  
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Congressional Research Service, this thesis intends to determine the origins of current CI 
protection policies and the underlying challenges in accomplishing the mission. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 calls for “strategic improvements in 
security that can make it more difficult for attacks to succeed and can lessen the impact of 
attacks that may occur. In addition to strategic enhancements, tactical security 
improvements can be rapidly implemented to deter, mitigate, or neutralize potential 
attacks.”6 Presidential Policy Directive 21,7 the overarching federal policy that dictates 
IP, is also focused primarily on the physical protection of facilities from terrorist attacks, 
which is why this research is focused exclusively on that aspect of the CI protection 
mission. 
This research does not include cyber and all-hazard (hurricanes, earthquakes, and 
other natural hazards) threats. The nature and source of cyber threats are constantly 
evolving and with nearly all aspects of infrastructure, business, and personal life 
connected to the Internet, these threats are too broad and uncertain for the purposes of 
this research. The GAO has also reported that DHS lacks a strategy for defining, 
identifying, and assessing the cyber risks to buildings,8 thus, this research focuses on the 
more established physical security mission. All-hazards planning is rooted in the 
evaluation of the risks from predictable or forecastable natural disasters for determining 
how mitigation efforts (e.g., building a flood wall or adding structural shoring) can hedge 
those risks. The unpredictability and uncertainty of intentional terrorist attacks on 
physical infrastructure facilities requires completely different protective measures and 
evaluations of risk for determining vulnerability. According to Homeland Security 
Secretary Jeh Johnson’s May 2015 remarks, “counterterrorism must remain the 
cornerstone of our Department’s overall homeland security mission. It’s the reason the 
                                                 
6 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (Washington, DC: The White House, 
2003), http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7. 
7 The White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 
8 Government Accountability Office, Federal Facility Cyber Security DHS and GSA Should Address 
Cyber Risk to Building and Access Control Systems (GAO-15-6) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667512.pdf.  
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Department was created by Congress in the wake of 9/11.”9 Cyber intrusions and natural 
disasters are not the primary focus of DHS, which is why this research focuses on the 
protection of physical infrastructure from terrorist attacks.  
This research also does not evaluate classified and protected CI information.10 
Infrastructure is public by the nature of the services the facilities provide the consumers 
(who are the general public) and the private ownership of the majority of facilities. Since 
protection of this infrastructure is a shared mission between the government and private 
industry, openly sharing information about what is critical is necessary to coordinate 
effectively across multiple industries, private owners, local governments, and the public. 
The GAO has highlighted that the “Department of Homeland Security is not positioned to 
manage an integrated and coordinated government approach for assessments [of critical 
infrastructure facilities] as called for in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.”11 
Classification likely contributes to the lack of integration and coordination between all 
parties involved in IP by preventing the open sharing of information. This thesis 
investigates openly available information and is not an evaluation of the classified tiered 
list of infrastructure facilities maintained by the DHS Security Office of Infrastructure 
Protection. 
D. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
This thesis is organized to provide the reader with the background on CI policies, 
explain the problems with the current CI protection efforts, and offer explanations for the 
root of these problems. The thesis then explores cases studies that challenge general 
assumptions about CI facilities and offers an alternative strategy as a solution. 
                                                 
9 Jeh Charles Johnson, “Remarks By Secretary Jeh Charles Johnson On “The New Realities Of 
Homeland Security” As Part of the Landon Lecture Series on Public Issues—As Prepared for Delivery,” 
Department of Homeland Security, May 27, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/05/27/remarks-secre 
tary-homeland-security-jeh-charles-johnson-%E2%80%9C-new-realities-homeland. 
10 “Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program,” June 18, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/ 
protected-critical-infrastructure-information-pcii-program.  
11 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection DHS Action Needed to 
Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts (GAO-14-507) (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665788.pdf. 
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Chapter II, the literature review, examines the federal IP policies that have been 
issued over the past 35 years to determine the origin and evolution of the mission. Within 
these documents, a consensus can be drawn that the definition of the term “critical 
infrastructure” is the systems and assets that are nationally significant and the loss of 
which would result in debilitating consequences to the safety and security of the United 
States.  
Chapter III, the problems with current DHS CI policies, summarizes the concrete 
shortfalls with IP that have been documented. An underlying problem is that many of the 
currently designated CI facilities do not meet the consensus definition identified in the 
literature review. This chapter also explores the challenges from the mandate to develop a 
centralized list of facilities and the problems with relying on individual facilities to self-
assess, and subsequently, overestimate risk. 
Chapter IV, the source of the problems, examines theoretical explanations for the 
challenges with accomplishing the current CI protection mission. Modern military 
theories provide a potential explanation for the focus of DHS’s efforts because the threats 
from terrorism have likely been evaluated based on the education and experience of 
senior officials with principles of strategic warfare. The strategic warfare approach of 
developing a static list of vulnerable assets does not match the unpredictable and dynamic 
threat from terrorism. The current IP policies identify the likely targets of a nation-state 
army and assume them to be the same targets that terrorists would have the intention and 
capability of attacking. 
Chapter V, case studies of the destruction of critical facilities, explores the 
concept of protecting CI that could altogether be a wasted effort because when 
supposedly CI is destroyed, the impacts are often negligible, or in some cases, even 
results in economic gains.  
Chapter VI, an alternative strategy, provides a solution for accomplishing the task 
of effectively identifying, prioritizing, and protecting CI, and refines the criteria for how 
facilities are determined to be critical. A lower number of critical facilities will reduce the 
overall scope of the protection mission. To identify facilities more effectively that are CI, 
 6
the DHS should consider using a risk-based approach within a more narrow definition of 
the term that can be modeled after best practices from the United Kingdom (UK). 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
Over the past 30 years, federal government policies have stated the importance of 
protecting CI. Key documents in defining this protection mission have included President 
Clinton’s Executive Order 13010, the USA PATRIOT Act, Presidential Policy Directive 
63, multiple iterations of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), and 
the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. As the concepts within the policies 
develop over time, the definitions of CI continues to remain focused on the systems and 
assets that are nationally significant and their losses result in debilitating consequences to 
the safety and security of the United States.  
B. PRE-9/11 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN FEDERAL POLICY 
Prior to the establishment of DHS, the concept of CI existed in federal policies. In 
the 1980s, the Congressional Budget Office determined CI to be systems that “share 
common characteristics of capital intensiveness and high public investment at all levels 
of government.” Infrastructure was divided into seven critical sectors: “highways, public 
transit, wastewater treatment, water resources, air traffic control, airports, and municipal 
water supply.”12 While this list did not include other sectors that are now considered 
critical, such as communications systems, the methodology of the analysis used during 
the time period was based on the assumption stated in the 1988 Congressional report that 
CI “excludes some facilities often thought of as infrastructure where the initial onus of 
responsibility is on private individuals.”13  
Prior to September 11, 2001 (9/11), President Clinton’s Executive Order 13010 
defined CI as being “so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating 
                                                 
12 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Public Works Infrastructure: Policy Considerations for the 
1980s (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 1. 
13 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, New Directions for the Nation’s Public Works (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), xi–xii. 
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impact on the defense or economic security of the United States.”14 PDD/NSC-63 
follows the same rhetoric by stating that CI is “so vital to the Nation that their incapacity 
or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic 
security, and/or national public health and safety.”15 The protection mission of the 
directive focused on identifying the “minimum essential infrastructure in each sector,” 
which would include only the infrastructure that would “significantly damage the United 
States” if it was attacked.16 In response to the requirements of PDD/NSC-63 for 
government components to provide their own specific IP plans, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) articulated some of the challenges to meeting the directive’s 
requirements. The 1998 DOD Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan asserts that “the 
complexity of the problem manifests itself in the lack of shared understanding of the 
terminology and the variety of different perceptions held by the Department’s and the 
nation’s leadership about the meaning and discipline of designing evolving, assuring, and 
protecting infrastructure.”17 To address PDD-63’s requirement to determine the 
minimum essential infrastructure in each sector, the DOD plan states, “this begs the 
questions: essential or critical to whom or for what?,”18 which shows the continued 
challenges in determining what constitutes infrastructure as critical. 
C. 9/11–DRIVEN POLICIES AND THE FORMATION OF DHS 
In the Bush Administration’s original proposal for defining the roles of DHS in 
2002, identifying and protecting CI were specific tasks for the department. While the 
                                                 
14 Exec. Order No. 13010, Critical Infrastructure Protection (1996), accessed July 26, 2015, 
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo13010.htm. 
15 The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 (Washington, DC: The White House, 
1998), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Department of Defense, The Department of Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan Version 




proposal stated the mission, the definition of CI was lacking, which made the success in 
meeting the IP mission difficult to measure.19  
While infrastructure systems have been determined to be critical through a variety 
of measures, the USA PATRIOT Act provides a concrete definition that is cited within 
subsequent policies, national plans, and directives pertaining to CI. The USA PATRIOT 
Act states that CI is “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such system and assets would have 
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, and national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters.”20 
In 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD): Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protect, gave the Secretary of Homeland Security the 
statutory responsibility of “coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the 
protection of the CI and key resources of the United States.”21 The CI protection mission 
was rooted in protecting infrastructure that would cause a catastrophic loss of life, impair 
the government’s ability to function, or cripple the economy.22 This directive also 
assigned the Secretary of Homeland Security with the responsibility for designating 
events as “national special security events” but that assignment within this directive is not 
stated to be directly related to the IP missions.23 
Prior to the most current version of the NIPP, the first Interim National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan published in February 2005, offered the definition of then 
critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) as the “infrastructure and key resources 
                                                 
19 John Moteff, Claudia Copeland, and John Fischer, Critical Infrastructures: What Makes an 
Infrastructure Critical? (CRS Report No. RL31556) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2003, http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL31556.pdf. 
20 1016(e) of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. §5195c(e) (2001). 
21 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (Washington, DC: The White House, 2003), Section 11, 
http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7.  
22 Ibid., Section 7. 
23 Ibid., Section 26. 
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vital to our national security, economic vitality, and way of life.”24 An attack on the 
nation’s key resources would have “cascading effects” and cause “large-scale human 
casualties and property destruction…also profound damage to the national prestige, 
morale, and confidence.”25 The plan proposed that a two-pronged approach of reducing 
vulnerabilities and taking threat-initiated actions as the best strategy for reducing risks to 
infrastructure.26 Being the first iteration of the NIPP, the plan focuses on data collection 
(through the national CI/KR inventory) and the identification of risks rather than the 
concept of resilient systems, which appear in the newer versions of the document. The 
interim NIPP was formalized in the 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan—
Partnering to Enhance Protection and Resiliency. A significant change in the 2009 
version was the increased focus on the concept of resiliency and a three-pronged 
approach of deterring threats, mitigating vulnerabilities, and minimizing consequences 
(resiliency).27  
The Guide to Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection at the State, 
Regional, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Level published in September 2008 defines CI as 
“the assets, systems, and network that, if damaged, would result in significant 
consequences—where the degree of impact on economic security, public health and 
safety, public confidence, loss of life, or some combination of these adverse outcomes 
has been established through the criteria identified.”28 In describing the methodology for 
gathering information about CI, the document explains, “some sectors include certain 
classes of assets, systems, or networks that are unlikely to be the target of an attack 
and/or are relatively inconsequential if attacked. These assets will not need to be 
                                                 
24 Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2005), 1, https://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/csd3754.pdf. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 10. 
27 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan—Partnering to 
Enhance Protection and Resiliency (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2009), 7, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf. 
28 Department of Homeland Security, A Guide to Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection 
at the State, Regional, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Level (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008), 31, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp_srtltt_guide.pdf. 
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identified.”29 It is an important assertion that all infrastructure systems are not critical and 
should not be identified because not all infrastructure facilities are significant. 
The National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program (NIPP) called for 
developing a list of the nation’s “highest priority infrastructure” based on “effects of an 
event on public health and safety, and economic, psychological, and government mission 
impacts.”30 This analysis was consequence-based around five levels of impact. Following 
the CI definitions from other federal documents, Level-1 and Level-2 infrastructure 
losses would have “nationally or multi-state significant loss of life, public health, 
economic, and/or national security impacts.”31 
D. CURRENT HOMELAND SECURITY POLICIES 
The 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) suggests that 
identifying CI comes through “identifying the assets, systems, and networks that are 
essential to the continued operation, considering associated dependencies and 
interdependencies. The federal government identifies and prioritizes nationally 
significant CI base upon statutory definition and national considerations.”32 According to 
the NIPP, risk should be managed by “understanding the criticality as well as the 
associated interdependencies of infrastructure. Lifeline functions such as 
communications, energy, transportation, and water are the most critical infrastructure 
sectors.”33 
                                                 
29 Department of Homeland Security, A Guide to Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection 
at the State, Regional, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Level, 33. 
30 “About: Infrastructure Information Collection Division,” July 14, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/about-
infrastructure-information-collection-division.  
31 Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Lessons Learned 
Information Sharing, Infrastructure Systems: Developing a Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
(CIKR) Plan (Houston, TX: Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 
2014), 3, http://www.readyharris.org/external/content/document/1829/2233754/1/20140825%20LLIS 
ICKR.pdf. 
32 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013—Partnering for 
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2013), 16, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIPP%202013_Partnering%20for%20 
Critical%20Infrastructure%20Security%20and%20Resilience_508_0.pdf. 
33 Ibid., 17. 
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Presidential Policy Directive 21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
(PPD-21) released in February 2013 asserts, “the Nation’s critical infrastructure provides 
the essential services that underpin American society. Proactive and coordinated efforts 
are necessary to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical 
infrastructure—including assets, networks, and systems—that are vital to public 
confidence and the Nation’s safety, prosperity, and well-being.”34 A solution for securing 
infrastructure is offered through developing resilience, which will allow “critical 
infrastructure to be secure and able to withstand and rapidly recover from all hazards.” 
Further, “all Federal department and agency heads are responsible for the identification, 
prioritization, assessment, remediation, and security of their respective internal CI that 
supports primary mission essential functions. Such infrastructure shall be addressed in the 
plans and execution of the requirements in the National Continuity Policy.”35 The policy 
calls on “the Federal Government to work with CI owners and operators to take proactive 
steps to manage risk and strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation’s critical 
infrastructure, considering all hazards that could have a debilitating impact on national 
security, economic stability, public health, and safety, or any combination thereof.”36 The 
requirements within PPD-21 emphasize that hazards to CI must have a “debilitating” 
impact on the nation.37 The document’s glossary defines  
the term critical infrastructure, provided in section 1016(e) of the USA 
Patriot Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)), as namely systems and assets, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity 
or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact 
on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or 
any combination of those matters.38 
Resilience is a concept interconnected with IP. The 2013 NIPP Supplemental 
Tool: Incorporating Resilience into Critical Infrastructure Projects defines resilience as 
                                                 
34 The White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 






“the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover 
from deliberate attacks, accident, or national occurring threats or incidents. Resilient 
infrastructure systems are flexible and agile and should be able to bounce back after 
disruption.”39 While the NIPP Supplemental Tool offers a list of recommendations for 
increasing the resilience of a CI sector, recommendations like “conduct vulnerability 
assessments to identify known and future risks” and “build redundancy into infrastructure 
systems” are a far stretch from providing actionable recommendations for allowing 
facilities to “bounce back” following disruptions. The NIPP Supplemental Tool restates 
the factors contributing to CI failures without offering solutions. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, 
Prioritization, and Protection frames infrastructure facilities that must be protected as the 
sites that “threaten national security, cause mass casualties, weaken our economy, and 
damage public morale and confidence.” The CI facilities provide the “essential services 
that underpin American society.”40 
CI is also a topic within the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(QHSR). In the context of natural disasters, the loss of CI causes “widespread disruptions 
of essential services across the country.”41 The QHSR states that CI provides “essential 
services that underpin the American way of life” and “interconnected infrastructure 
consists of multiple systems that rely on one another to greater degrees for their 
operation.”42 Following the same concepts as the 2013 NIPP, the QHSR suggests 
infrastructure that is “more reliable, efficient, and resilient”43 and that can be a solution to 
protecting the delivery of essential services. 
                                                 
39 Department of Homeland Security, Supplemental Tool: Incorporating Resilience into Critical 
Infrastructure Projects (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 1, http://www.dhs. 
gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIPP%202013%20Supplement_Incorporating%20Resilience%20into%
20CI%20Projects_508.pdf. 
40 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. 
41 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 22, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014 
-qhsr-final-508.pdf. 
42 Ibid., 23. 
43 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 24. 
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Executive Order 13636—Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
published in 2013 follows a similar definition as the USA PATRIOT Act by stating that 
the loss of CI has “a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national 
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”44 Section 9 specifies that 
efforts should be focused on the CI systems that cause catastrophic national or regional 
impacts. 
E. PEER-REVIEWED WRITING ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Peer reviewed articles on CI utilize the same general definition that CI is the 
interconnected systems that can have debilitating impacts to the nation if they fail. 
In studying the cascading impacts of infrastructure failure, CI is defined as the  
complex systems of components that ensure production, transport, 
communication, health, safety, and any other activities necessary for a 
society’s (country’s) needs. Its disruption or destruction would affect the 
teams working at these complexes, the surrounding structures, public 
health and safety, the economy, and national security.45  
Interdependency between CI systems is used as a basic assumption for in-depth 
analysis of systems. A risk analysis approach to studying CI focused on the “rippling 
effect of hazardous disturbances (such as natural or willful hazards) to any CI can be far-
reaching and long-lasting. This forms a cascading effect, which may be far greater than 
the initial loss inflicted by the direct disturbance.”46 
An analysis of engineering resilience into physical facilities defined CI as 
“significant pieces of plant and equipment, such as power stations and motorways. High 
population densities in cities, and the increasing interconnectedness of the services and 
                                                 
44 Exec. Order No. 13636—Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (2013), 3, http://www. 
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-19/pdf/2013-03915.pdf.  
45 Farid Kadri, Bibiga Birregah, and Eric Châtelet, “The Impact of Natural Disasters on Critical 
Infrastructures: A Domino Effect-based Study,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management 11, no. 2 (2014): 217–241, http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-2012-0077. 
46 Pu Jiang and Yacov Y. Haimes, “Risk Management for Leontief-based Interdependent Systems,” 
Risk Analysis 24, no. 5 (2004): 1215–1229, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00520.x. 
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supply chains that sustain them.”47 A study of engineering resilient transportation 
systems proposed that transportation infrastructure that would cause debilitating impacts 
should be reengineered to be durable to lessen the impact from natural disasters.48 A 
similar analysis of security for physical facilities defined CI as the “infrastructures are so 
vital that incapacity would have far-reaching and debilitating effects on the United States 
and her allies.”49 
Joseph’s article “Critical Business Elements and Key Assets” identifies the 
additional challenge that federal policy does not provide specific guidelines for 
determining criticality. “The scope and complexity of CI sectors can make this a daunting 
task to identify which specific assets are critical. Most of these guidelines do not provide 
specific basis for determining ‘criticality’ in the broader economic or social welfare 
impacts as called for in federal critical infrastructure strategies.”50 
F. ANALYSIS OF IMPLICATIONS OF CI DEFINITIONS 
Federal government reports, plans, policies, and directives from the 1980s to 
today, emphasize that CI is the interconnected systems that can cause debilitating impacts 
to the safety and security of the nation if they are destroyed by natural disasters or 
terrorism. Scholarly studies of CI use the same definitions for framing their analysis of 
the topic.  
As demonstrated by Table 1, 13 overarching federal government policies released 
over the past 19 years consistently describe CI as being nationally significant, providing 
vital services, being part of an interconnected system, causing debilitating impacts if 
                                                 
47 Christopher D. F. Rogers et al., “Resistance and Resilience-Paradigms for Critical Local 
Infrastructure,” Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers: Mechanical Engineering 165, no. 2 
(2012): 73–83, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1223110482?accountid=12702.  
48 Institute of Transportation Engineers, “Ahead of the Storm: Engineering for Disaster,” ITE Journal, 
2013, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1468925507?accountid=12702. 
49 Lee Parrish and Mark Leary, “Secure Global Collaboration among Critical Infrastructures,” 
Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective 18, no. 2 (2009): 57–63, http://search.proquest.com/ 
docview/743437113?accountid=12702.  
50 Anthony Joseph, “Critical Business Elements and Key Assets,” Security 43, no. 8 (2006): 40–41, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/197794745?accountid=12702.  
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destroyed, and providing a service necessary to the health and safety of the general 
public. 
Table 1.   Analysis of Definitions of Critical Infrastructure 















X X X X X 
2013 NIPP X X X  X 
2013 PPD-21: CI X X X X X 
2013 Executive Order 
13636 
X X X X X 
2011 NCIPP Level 
1/Level 2 
Program 
X X X X X 
2009 NIPP X X X X X 
2008 NIPP SRTLTT 
Guide  




X X X X X 
2005 Interim NIPP X X X X X 
2003 HSPD 7 X X X X X 
2001 USA PATRIOT 
Act 
X X X X X 
1998 PDD/NSC-63 X X X X X 
1996 Executive Order 
13010 




X X    
 
DHS currently provides a wide-ranging list of facilities within 16 different sectors 
that are considered to be critical.52 The emphasis on national significance, vital services, 
interdependent systems, debilitating impacts, and safety of the public in each prominent 
                                                 
51 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 27. 
52 “Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” June 12, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors.  
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CI definition show a consensus in the definition of the term. An agreed upon definition of 
what is critical allows for the interpretation of what is not CI.  
G. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS 
Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
identifies 16 different sectors53 into which CI facilities are organized. These sectors and 
various subsectors, components, industries, segments, and disciples include: 
 Chemical Sector 
 Basic Chemical Component 
 Specialty Chemical Component 
 Agricultural Chemical Component 
 Pharmaceuticals Component 
 Consumer Products Component 
 Commercial Facilities Sector 
 Public Assembly Subsector 
 Sports Leagues Subsector 
 Gaming Subsector 
 Lodging Subsector 
 Outdoor Events Subsector 
 Entertainment and Media Subsector 
 Real Estate Subsector 
 Retail Subsector 
 Communications Sector 
 Critical Manufacturing Sector 
 Primary Metal Manufacturing Industry 
 Machinery Manufacturing Industry 
 Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing 
Industry 
                                                 
53 The White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 
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 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing Industry 
 Dams Sector 
 Defense Industrial Base Sector 
 Emergency Services Sector 
 Law Enforcement Discipline 
 Fire and Emergency Services Discipline 
 Emergency Management Discipline 
 Emergency Medical Services Discipline 
 Public Works Discipline 
 Energy Sector 
 Electricity Segment 
 Petroleum Segment 
 Natural Gas Segment 
 Food and Agriculture Sector 
 Government facilities Sector 
 Healthcare and Public Health Sector 
 Information Technology Sector 
 Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector 
 Transportation Sector 
 Aviation Subsector 
 Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier Subsector 
 Maritime Transportation System Subsector 
 Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Subsector 
 Pipeline System Subsector 
 Freight Rail Subsector 
 Postal and Shipping Subsector 
 Water and Wastewater Systems Sector54 
                                                 
54 “Critical Infrastructure Sectors.” 
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H. COMMERCIAL FACILITIES SECTOR 
A sector that can serve as an example for how to re-categorize facilities currently 
designated as critical is the CF sector. The mission of protecting the CF sector presented 
in the 2010 NIPP Sector Specific Plan (SSP)—Commercial Facilities lacks emphasis on 
“essential-to-life services” referenced in other descriptions of CI. The sector’s mission 
also lacks emphasis on debilitating economic damage to the nation, and instead, focuses 
on the operations of individual businesses:  
The Commercial Facilities Sector envisions a secure, resilient, and 
profitable sector in which effective and non-obstructive risk management 
programs instill a positive sense of safety and security in the public and 
sustain favorable business environments that are conducive to attracting 
and retaining employees, tenants, and customers.55 
The emphasis on resilience, openness, and private sector profitability does not 
suggest that critical functions are being carried out, and the loss of those functions would 
result in debilitating impacts to the nation, rather than losses to individual private sector 
corporations. While CI systems can be mapped to key nodes causing failure across 
multiple systems, the CF sector supplement section on prioritizing infrastructures states 
that it does “not believe it is appropriate to develop a single overarching prioritized list of 
assets for the Commercial Facilities Sector. Instead, assets are categorized using a 
consequence methodology that allows the Commercial Facilities Sector Specific 
Agencies to drive sector-wide protection efforts.”56 Further showing the lack of 
interconnected systems within the CF sector, “individual owners and operators apply 
effective implementation and evaluation of protective programs and resilience 
strategies.”57  
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan—Commercial Facilities Sector 
Specific Plan uses dollar figures and statistics to attempt to show the national importance 
of the CF sectors. Examples, such as “the retail industry generates $4.6 trillion in annual 
                                                 
55 Department of Homeland Security, Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan an Annex to the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2010 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2010), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-commercial-facilities-2010.pdf.  
56 Ibid., 3. 
57 Ibid. 
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sales” and “35 million Americans work in office buildings,”58 are attempts to show the 
national implications of losses to the sector but CF are not a single entity. An attack or 
multiple attacks on CF would not result in massive losses across the entire sector. The 
document cites, “1.6 million U.S. retail establishments that employ 24 million 
Americans.” If simultaneous terrorist attacks destroyed 100 different retail establishments 
with each business having $10 million in annual revenue (well above the national 
average59), the losses would be less than .04% of the entire retail industry’s annual total 
revenue ($1 billion in losses compared with $4.6 trillion in annual revenue).  
The vulnerability of the facilities in the sector is attributed to the number of 
people occupying the buildings rather than the importance of the actual structures: 
The CF Sector is one of the few CIKR sectors that terrorists have attacked 
successfully. Commercial facilities are especially vulnerable due to the 
large inventory of buildings across the Nation that are open to the public 
and are populated by large numbers of people on a daily basis. 
Commercial facilities are designed to be welcoming and attractive to 
customers and can be contrary to design security principals.60 
The factors used to assess the criticality of CF are not based around performance 
measures that relate to providing essential-to-life functions or measures impacting 
national economic security. As a counter example, the energy sector measures ability to 
deliver power to customers. The CF sector uses attributes, such as the “height of 
building” and “number of rooms,” as measures of importance but neither of these factors 
direct measures of criticality of the facility. An electric power plant measures its 
performance in megawatts of power produced not by the height of the smoke stack, 
which is just a physical attribute of the facility. Within CF, a higher number of rooms do 
not mean that the facility is always fully occupied or more critical than a smaller 
building. The factors listed as the “attributes of interest” for the CF sector are seemingly 
                                                 
58 Department of Homeland Security, Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan an Annex to the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2010, 7. 
59 “Small Business Overview,” 2015, http://asq.org/learn-about-quality/small-
business/overview/overview.html.  
60 Department of Homeland Security, Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan an Annex to the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2010, 8. 
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arbitrary to the function of facility. These arbitrary attributes of interest identified within 
the CF sector plan include:  
 Facility Location: General geographic situation (e.g., financial district, 
industrial park). 
 Facility Proximity: Proximity to high-risk enterprises (e.g., adjacency to 
an iconic landmark or important federal building). 
 Facility Size: Height, footprint, number of floors, hotel rooms, apartments, 
public areas, and exhibition/retail space. 
 Facility Capacity/Attendance: Design population annual attendance (e.g., 
the number of tenants in an office building, spectators at a sporting event, 
and visitors/participants at an outdoor event). 
 Facility Type: Purpose or use of the facility (e.g., office building, stadium, 
hotel, amusement park). 
 Geographical Area: Defined by local government, it includes prestigious 
commercial (e.g., retail, hotels, and office buildings) and residential assets 
that are nationally recognized as a tourist destination and unified economic 
entity. 
 Facility Functions: Types of events held in the facility (e.g., national 
sporting events, political conventions, and controversial exhibitions). 
 Facility Value: Iconic and economic status of the facility (e.g., historical 
status, owner, tenants, and clientele).61 
Regulatory agencies were developed more than 100 years ago to protect 
consumers, the government, and the economic stability of the United States from 
mismanagement of essential services (manufacturing, banking, transportation, etc.).62 
“The commercial facilities sector is considered a non-regulatory sector” and has “no 
obligations that require owners to disclose information to the government.”63 While this 
lack of regulation can seemingly be a barrier to IP, it is also an indication of the lack of 
criticality within the sector due the historic absence of government interest and oversight. 
                                                 
61 Department of Homeland Security, Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan an Annex to the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2010, 20. 
62 “A Brief History of Administrative Government,” 2015, http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3461.  
63 Department of Homeland Security, Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan an Annex to the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2010, 30. 
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I. CONCLUSION 
Federal government documents over the past 35 years have a consensus in their 
definition of CI being the systems and assets that are nationally significant and the 
facility losses result in debilitating consequences to the safety and security of the United 
States. Based on this analysis of the literature, infrastructure that lacks national 
significance, criticality, and interconnectedness of other infrastructure systems does not 
meet the definition of “critical infrastructure.” It represents a discrepancy between the 
federal policies that define CI and how DHS currently views infrastructure facilities. 
While DHS takes an all-inclusive approach to include as many facilities as possible under 
the designation as “critical,” CI has consistently been defined as only the systems that are 
nationally significant. This problem is apparent when looking at the CF sector due to the 
measures of critically that relate to physical attributes of the facilities and do not relate to 
nationally significant essential-to-life services or maintaining economic security.  
To challenge the current CI protection policies relating to CF further, case studies 
of the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Las Vegas Strip challenge general assertions 
of the negative economic impact occurring after the destruction of a “critical” 
commercial facility. A case study of the 2014 toxic chemical spill into the primary water 
source serving Charleston, WV also provides an example that is contrary to the concept 
that the loss of a facility serving as sole provider of an essential-to-life service results in 
debilitating impacts across all infrastructure sectors within a local area. 
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III. WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT DHS 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE POLICIES? 
As demonstrated in the literature review, numerous federal government 
documents come to a consensus in their definition of CI as a facility that serves as a 
single or substantial provider of an essential function or service interconnected to other 
infrastructure systems. The problem with DHS policies is that many facilities do not meet 
this definition but are still considered to be “critical infrastructure.” The origin of this 
issue may stem from the directive for DHS to develop a list of all the critical facilities 
around the country. Creating a national list of assets across 16 sectors of infrastructure 
resulted in a generally inclusive approach to identifying facilities. 
A. NATIONAL ASSET DATABASE 
Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the NADB to 
categorize and prioritize CI facilities across the country. The first DHS Infrastructure 
Protection Risk Management Division list identified 160 nationally critical sites.64 
The 2007 Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act Sec. 704 directs 
the Secretary of Homeland Security65 to: 
(A) Maintaining a catalog of the Nation’s most at risk infrastructure in a 
single repository of national assets known as the National Asset Database, 
and use such database in the development, coordination, integration, and 
implementation of plans and programs, including to identify, catalog, 
prioritize, and protect critical infrastructure and key resources in 
accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, and in 
cooperation with all levels of government and private sector entities that 
the Secretary considers appropriate; and 
 
 
                                                 
64 Office of Inspector General, Progress in Developing the National Asset Database. 
65 United States Congress, Committee Reports 109th Congress (2005–2006) House Report 109-713—
Part 1 (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, Thomas, 2007), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/? 
&sid=cp109alJsu&r_n=hr713p1.109&dbname=cp109&&sel=TOC_192496&. 
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(B) Consulting the National Asset Database, along with other appropriate 
resources, in providing any covered grant to assist in preventing, reducing, 
mitigating, or responding to a terrorist attack.66 
The Authorization Act also tasked the DHS Secretary to provide an annual report 
of the “extent to which the database has been used as a tool for allocating funds to 
prevent, reduce, mitigate, and respond to terrorist attacks.”67 According to the DHS 
Office of Inspector General’s (OIG’s) report Progress in Developing the National Asset 
Database, 77,069 critical assets were designated in 2006. See Figure 1.68  
Figure 1.  National Asset Database Growth 2003–2006 
 
From Office of Inspector General, Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 
(OIG-06-40) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2006), http://www. 
oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_06-40_Jun06.pdf. 
CF and government facilities account for nearly 40% of the nationally designated 
critical facilities. The original criteria for the July 2004 DHS data call provided the 
guidance for identifying facilities as CI quantified critical CF as “commercial centers 
with potential economic loss impact of $10 billion or capacity of more than 35,000 
                                                 
66 United States Congress, Committee Reports 109th Congress (2005–2006) House Report 109-713—
Part 1 
67 Ibid. 
68 Office of Inspector General, Progress in Developing the National Asset Database. 
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individuals.” While those numbers may seem significant, $10 billion dollars in loses is 
not nationally significant in a $2.4 trillion economy,69 and 128 different universities have 
division football programs playing in stadiums with capacities over 35,000 individuals.70 
It seems unlikely that the football stadium at every large university is an infrastructure 
facility that is essential to the nation. These broad criteria for the NADB likely were the 
reason the number of critical facilities grew so rapidly. See Figure 2. 
Figure 2.  National Asset Database Totals by Sector 
 
From Office of Inspector General, Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 
(OIG-06-40) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2006), http://www. 
oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_06-40_Jun06.pdf. 
The DHS Inspector General concluded that the NADB contained “many unusual 
or out-of-place assets whose criticality is not readily apparent, and too few assets in 
essential areas and may represent an incomplete picture.” The assets in question included 
“4,055 malls, shopping centers, and retail outlets, 224 racetracks, 539 theme parks and 
163 water parks, 1,305 casinos, 234 retail stores, 514 religious meeting places, 127 gas 
                                                 
69 “Current United States GDP,” 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.  
70 “Current NCAA Division 1 Football Teams,” 2010, http://www.databasefootball.com/College/ 
teams/teamlist.htm.  
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stations, 130 libraries, 4,164 educational facilities, 217 railroad bridges, and 335 
petroleum pipelines.”71 
How did DHS end up with so many facilities on the NADB list? The broad scope 
of the IP mission, selection criteria that are below the threshold for national significant, a 
$4 billion annual program budget that needed to be spent, and lack of measureable 
criteria of assessing risk, protection, and performance, were likely contributing factors to 
the problem. Another likely source of the problem is the reliance of DHS on facilities to 
self-assess risk. 
B. OVERESTIMATION OF RISK DURING VULNERABILITY 
ASSESSMENTS OF FACILITIES 
The September 2014 United States GAO Report to Congressional Requesters—
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Action Needed to Enhance Integration and 
Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts provides a laundry list of issues the 
department is having with assessing and documenting risks to CI facilities. DHS has “not 
consistently captured and maintained data, is not positioned to manage an integrated and 
coordinated government approach for assessments called for in the NIPP, and current 
efforts potentially are potentially duplicative or leave gaps among the CI [facilities] 
assessed.”72 
It should be noted that while a wide variety of risks arise from natural disasters 
and Internet-based cyber disruptions, the DHS assessments focus on physical 
vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack on a facility that can be lessened by protective 
measures including the presence of a security force, access control, or perimeter 
barriers.73 Of the 10 DHS vulnerability assessment tools, all 10 have questions relating to 
vulnerability to intentional attacks but only two of the 10 have assessment criteria 
                                                 
71 John Moteff, Critical Infrastructure: The National Asset Database (CRS Report Order Code 
RL33648) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 1–7. 
72 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection DHS Action Needed to 
Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts. 
73 Ibid., 4. 
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relating to “vulnerability to all-hazards,” such as hurricanes and earthquakes.74 See 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3.  GAO Comparison of Selected Areas Included in the Department of 
Homeland Security Vulnerability Assessment Tools and Methods 
 
From Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection DHS Action 
Needed to Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts 
(GAO-14-507) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014), 19, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665788.pdf. 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required DHS to conduct vulnerability 
assessments to assess and prioritize CI facilities. The GAO found that between 2011 and 
2013, DHS conducted thousands of vulnerability assessments but the department is not 
equipped to integrate the various assessments to identify priorities.75 With more than 
70,000 CI facilities across the country, DHS also relies on facilities to self-assess risk 
with tools, such as the DHS IP Risk Self-Assessment Tool, which relies on the facility 
                                                 
74 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection DHS Action Needed to 
Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts, 18. 
75 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection DHS Action Needed to 
Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts. 
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operator to decide the threat rating, vulnerability, hazards, and vulnerabilities.76 Between 
October 2010 and September 2014, GAO found that facility operators submitted 7,600 
self-assessments of facilities to DHS.77 The Environmental Protection Agency offers the 
Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool (VSAT) 6.0 to allow water and wastewater facilities 
to determine quantitative risk and resilience metrics, asset prioritization, and threats.78 
Unfortunately, people are generally very poor at self-assessing. 
People are generally over optimistic and overconfident with self-assessments. 
Poor self-assessment skills also apply to people with specialized knowledge who should 
be well qualified to make informed decisions. In an experiment with Masters of Business 
Administration (MBA) students (who have knowledge of statistics and standard 
distribution), a group was asked to predict the final grades in the course. With a standard 
distribution, 50% will be above and below the average with only 10% in the top decile. 
The results of the survey showed that a majority of students placed themselves in the 
highest or second highest decile, and only 5% placed themselves in the bottom 50%.79 
Even a group of students who should be well informed about standard distribution of 
grades, completely failed to predict their performance accurately in a course that shows 
the weakness in people’s self-assessment skills. This phenomenon of poor assessment is 
known as the “optimism bias.”  
The optimism bias extends beyond MBA students. People under estimate their 
risk for car accidents, think the chances of divorce are low, and expect to receive future 
promotions, gain wealth beyond current means, and possess a superior intellect to 
                                                 
76 Department of Homeland Security, Commercial Facilities Risk Self-Assessment Tool (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2012), http://www.ahla.com/uploadedFiles/RSAT%20Fact%20 
Sheet_05172012.pdf. 
77 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection DHS Action Needed to 
Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts, 13. 
78 “Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool (VSAT) 6.0,” September 4, 2014, http://water.epa.gov/infra 
structure/watersecurity/techtools/vsat.cfm.  
79 Richard H. Thale and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 20. 
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others.80 Optimism bias is evident in compulsive gamblers who will consistently 
overestimate the probability of winning high-risk bets.81 
The DHS Critical Infrastructure Protection Program hinges on assessing the risks 
and vulnerabilities to infrastructure facilities and prioritizing the protection of the most 
vulnerable ones. It creates an incentivized system in which the facilities that are 
determined to have the highest risk become the facilities with the most resources (and 
considered to be the most important). Just as an MBA student has a personal desire to 
receive a high grade or a gambler is motivated by a reward, a facilities manager 
conducting a risk self-assessment will likely be subconsciously biased to assess greater 
risks than actually exist. This problem can be exacerbated by inconsistent methods of 
assessing and documenting risk. DHS provides 10 different risk assessment tools that 
each vary in length, depth, and content as show in Table 3 from the GAO report that is 
presented in Figure 4. 
  
                                                 
80 Tali Sharot, “The Optimism Bias,” Science Direct, 21, no. 23 (2011): R941–R945, 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982211011912.  
81 “Pathological Gambling Caused by Excessive Optimism,” April 29, 2013, http://www.sciencedaily. 
com/releases/2013/04/130429102400.htm.  
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Figure 4.  Length of Department of Homeland Security  
Vulnerability Assessment Tolls and Methods  
(Number of Pages and Questions), by Type 
 
From Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection DHS Action 
Needed to Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts 
(GAO-14-507) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014), 17, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665788.pdf. 
An objective method for assessment should remove as many subjective measures 
as possible, but the GAO report found “differences in the detail of information collected 
in individual areas making it difficult to determine the extent to which the information 
collected was comparable [to other facilities] and what assumptions or judgments were 
used while gathering assessment data.”82 Some risk assessment tools use “yes/no” 
questions, while others have drop down menus of options and open-ended narratives.  
                                                 
82 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection DHS Action Needed to 
Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts, 20. 
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Once a facility is designated as a “critical infrastructure,” or receives resources 
from the government, the facility manager is likely to become “loss adverse” to giving up 
those resources or the prestige of the designation when conducting future risk 
assessments. Along the lines of being adverse to loss, people will disproportionally 
decide to stick with a current decision rather than make a change. People will stay with a 
retirement plan or health care policy even if more attractive alternatives are available, and 
this same thinking likely applies to a facility manager determining risks and 
vulnerabilities to a facility.83 The “status quo bias” may contribute to a facility that has 
been assessed as having a risk or vulnerability, reporting that same high level of risk in 
future assessments even if the risk or vulnerability has actually decreased.84 
While it is unrealistic for DHS to assess all CI facilities, the lack of consistency in 
self-assessment tools and the likelihood for errors in self-assessment creates unreliable 
results. The problem is compounded because GAO found that “it is unclear what areas 
DHS believes should be included in a comprehensive vulnerability assessment.” GAO 
reports, “DHS is not in a position to integrate assessments conducted or required by 
components within DHS to identify priorities for protective and supportive measures 
regarding threats to the nation or to support national-level comparative risk 
assessments.”85 
C. LOTS OF MONEY AND FEW MEASURABLE RESULTS 
The 2014 National Protection Framework86 defined CI protection as 
protecting the physical and cyber elements of critical infrastructure. This 
includes actions to deter the threat, reduce vulnerabilities, or minimize the 
consequences associated with a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or 
                                                 
83 William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, “Status Quo Bias in Decision Making,” Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty J Risk Uncertainty, 1 (1988): 7–59. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rzeckhau/SQB 
DM.pdf.  
84 Thale and Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, 34. 
85 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection DHS Action Needed to 
Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts, 24. 
86 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Protection Framework First Edition 




manmade disaster. Critical Infrastructure Protection is an element of 
critical infrastructure security and resilience as detailed in Presidential 
Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.87  
While the mission is defined, the goals of the mission remain unclear. The 2013 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan Supplemental Tool states, “goals and objectives 
are likely to vary across sectors and organizations depending on the risk landscape, 
operating environment, and composition of a specific industry, resource, or other aspect 
of critical infrastructure.”88 
Even with undefined goals, IP is a $72 billion market that is expected to double to 
$114 billion by 2019 according to a Security Technology market analysis prediction.89 
The DHS National Protection and Programs Director was budgeted $2.5 billion in 2013 
with additional resources for IP also included in FEMA’s $10.6 billion, FEMA Grants 
Program’s $2.3 billion, and DHS Science & Technology’s $668 million budgets.90 All 
this funding equates to an enormous amount of federal resources being dedicated to the 
CI protection mission, as shown in Figure 5. 
  
                                                 
87 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Protection Framework First Edition, 9. 
88 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Protection Framework First Edition. 
89 “Press Release: Critical Infrastructure Protection Market Worth $ 114.30 Billion by 2019,” 2015, 
http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/critical-infrastructure-protection-cip.asp.  
90 Department of Homeland Security, FY 2013 Budget in Brief (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-budget-in-brief-fy2013.pdf.  
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Figure 5.  Funding for the Infrastructure Protection and Information Security 
Program (in millions of dollars) 
 
From John D. Moteff, Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation 
(CRS Report No. RL30153) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL30153.pdf. 
In response to 2006 and 2011 efforts by Congress and GAO to determine the cost-
benefit of current CI protection programs, GAO issued the 2013 report Critical 
Infrastructure: Assessment of the Department of Homeland Security’s Report on the 
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Results of Its Critical Infrastructure Partnership Streamlining Efforts.91 According to the 
report: 
In 2011, a report of the Senate Committee on Appropriations 
accompanying H.R. 2017—the fiscal year 2012 spending bill for DHS—
noted that the department’s budget request stated that NPPD would 
streamline various methods and processes for coordination and 
information sharing with industry partners through NIPP management, 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources coordination, and SSA 
management. The committee report directed NPPD to provide a report, not 
later than 60 days after enactment of the bill, on the results from a 
thorough review of all efforts related to five areas: (1) coordinating and 
executing plans; (2) implementing performance metrics; (3) sustaining 
systemic communication; (4) executing SSA functions; and (5) providing 
education, training, and outreach. The committee report further stated that 
GAO shall review the results of the NPPD report and related efforts of the 
streamlining process no later than 60 days after receiving the report to 
determine the extent to which NPPD’s efforts were designed to ensure 
mission clarity, useful and actionable work products, efficacy of planning 
and information sharing, and that cost savings were achieved where 
possible. 
As these initiatives are under way or planned, we could not assess the 
extent to which they will identify efforts to streamline the processes for 
coordination and information sharing with industry partners. 
Figure 6 describes the requests of GAO for establishing streamlined practices 
being completed by DHS. 
  
                                                 
91 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure: Assessment of the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Results of Its Critical Infrastructure Partnership Streamlining Efforts (GAO-14-
100R) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/ 
659074.pdf. 
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Figure 6.  DHS’s Response to the Mandate in Each of the Five Areas 
Outlined in the Senate Committee Report 
 
 
From Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure: Assessment of the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Results of Its Critical Infrastructure Partnership 
Streamlining Efforts (GAO-14-100R), (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659074.pdf. 
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The failure to answer these Congressional and GAO inquiries follows a long line 
of similar shortfalls in providing evidence of program effectiveness and an overall lack of 
transparency by DHS. In response to GAO, the DHS Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Cost-Benefit Report92 is inconsistent regarding if cost-benefit analysis of CI protection 
has been undertaken. The GAO assessment did not have the scope to assess if measures 
to protect infrastructure were effective, or cost-effective, and DHS officials stated that by 
the time of the report, the information was outdated due to program maturation. 
According to Senator Coburn’s 2011 report on the effectiveness of DHS’s CI 
protection efforts,  
the Appropriations Committees of the Congress instructed DHS to review 
its efforts to streamline processes for coordinating and sharing information 
with private sector partners, including owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure, and to report on these efforts to Congress within 60 days. 
Two years later, the Appropriations Committees’ request was answered 
with a report from DHS. GAO reviewed the report and found it did not 
discuss NPPD’s effort to streamline the process for coordination and 
information sharing with industry partners, raising questions about 
whether the Department of Homeland Security was responding to 
Congress and making progress in this respect to become a more efficient 
partner with the private sector.93 
D. CHANGES TO NATIONAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PRIORITIZATION PROGRAM  
In 2013, GAO reported that the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection shifted 
the priorities of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (NCIPP) to focus 
efforts on three primary goals of identifying infrastructure that could significantly impact 
the nation, increase accuracy in prioritization, and improve planning and coordination 
with public and private stakeholders.94 The updated list of facilities on the NCIPP would 
                                                 
92 Government Accountability Office, The Department of Homeland Security’s Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Cost-Benefit Report (GAO-09-654R) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09654r.pdf. 
93 Tom Coburn, A Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Missions and Performance 
(Washington, DC: United States Senate, 2015), 29, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id= 
B92B8382 
94 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection—DHS List of Priority Assets 
Needs to be Validated and Reported to Congress (GAO-13-296) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2013), 9, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653300.pdf. 
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be used to allocate grant funding, prioritize protection programs, and inform incident 
planning and response efforts around the facilities.95 Unfortunately, according to GAO, 
the changes to the composition of the prioritization list were not validated, and DHS did 
not establish a process for identifying the impacts of the changes.96 
The consequence-based criteria for determining the prioritization of a facility is 
based on immediate loss of life, economic consequences directly or indirectly occurring 
from the loss, or how the infrastructure impacts mass evacuations from urban areas (see 
Figure 7). 
Figure 7.  NCIPP Consequence-Based Criteria and Relative Threshold Levels 
 
From Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection—DHS List of 
Priority Assets Needs to be Validated and Reported to Congress (GAO-13-296) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), 14, http://www.gao. 
gov/assets/660/653300.pdf. 
                                                 
95 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection—DHS List of Priority Assets 
Needs to be Validated and Reported to Congress, 11. 
96 Ibid., 12. 
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Just as the NADB focused on individual facilities instead of points of failure 
within the interconnected infrastructure system, the thresholds for prioritizing 
infrastructure in the NCIPP are also based around individual facilities loses with a focus 
on mass gatherings of people. The number of fatalities occurring immediately following 
an event suggests that something is happening at a facility that holds a large number of 
people. The future human losses from the destruction of a larger infrastructure system 
providing essential services are discounted from the prioritization criteria, which show 
the emphasis on single facilities. The measures of economic impact and evacuation time 
also align more closely with large facilities like stadiums and arenas instead of 
infrastructure systems, such as power grid components. It is unlikely that a power 
substation would have mass fatalities at the site, cause direct economic loses, or have an 
impact on evacuations but all those factors would be relevant if 80,000 people were in 
attendance at a football stadium. 
While the NADB was a list of only individual facilities, the NCIPP differentiates 
between individual facilities (assets) and clusters or systems (groups of facilities). The 
2013 DHS National Infrastructure Plan Supplemental Tool defines critical nodes as the 
point “where potential consequences would be highest”97 but based on the GAO analysis 
(Figure 8), nodes are only included within the NCIPP list as groups of nodes. The factors 
that differentiate between single facilities that are assets and single facilities that are 
nodes are unclear. 
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Figure 8.  Description and Illustration of an Asset, a Node, a Cluster,  
and a System 
 
From Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection—DHS List of 
Priority Assets Needs to be Validated and Reported to Congress (GAO-13-296) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), 18, http://www.gao. 
gov/assets/660/653300.pdf. 
GAO found that shifting the prioritization and designation of infrastructure “could 
hinder the ability to compare infrastructure across sectors and is not a validated process to 
ensure that it accurately reflects the nation’s highest-priority infrastructure.”98 Using 
measures associated with large groups of people to evaluate the thresholds for importance 
of functional systems may not be an effective strategy. GAO reported, “DHS could not 
provide documentation explaining how the threshold levels were established and the 
NCIPP list had not been verified or validated by an external peer review.”99 
Regardless of if DHS is maintaining a national database of facilities or a national 
prioritization list, the criteria, and process for determining which infrastructure facilities 
or systems are nationally significant, has been an ineffective effort. 
                                                 
98 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection—DHS List of Priority Assets 
Needs to be Validated and Reported to Congress, 24. 
99 Ibid., 25. 
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E. EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEM: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
CHEMICAL SECTOR 
One example of the IP problem is the DHS CI chemical sector where DHS has 
dedicated 242-fulltime positions and approximately $90 million to protecting 3,495 
critical chemical sector facilities. Further complicating this issue, DHS has identified 
40,000 total chemical facilities as critical but only 3,495 facilities have been categorized 
into tiers (measures of importance)100 and have completed approved facility security 
plans.101 A significant amount of manpower and funding has been committed by DHS for 
assessing and protecting chemical facilities. Even with a $90 million budget, only 10% of 
the facilities deemed to be critical have been assessed, which likely means the scope of 
the chemical sector protection mission is too broad. See Figure 9. 
Figure 9.  Number and Percentage of Facilities Assigned a Final Tier as of 
January 2013 
 
From Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection—DHS Efforts 
to Assess Chemical Security Risk and Gather Feedback on Facility Outreach Can Be 
Strengthened (GAO-13-353) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2013), 9, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-353. 
This expansive designation of “critical” for the chemical sector facilities comes 
primarily from the vulnerability of the facilities to theft of dangerous chemical materials 
and sabotage of the facility causing a chemical release. The tiered assessments are not 
based on how the chemicals produced by the facility provide essential services to other 
infrastructure sectors (e.g., chlorine production essential for water treatment in the 
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surrounding area). The assessment approach used to measure risk to chemical facilities is 
based instead on the level of interest a terrorist would have in attacking or infiltrating the 
facility to obtain chemical materials to utilize in an attack elsewhere. The protective 
services provided by DHS assisted facilities with developing facility security plans, 
which focused on a single facility and not how the sector delivers critical functions to the 
public or other infrastructure sectors.102 In 2007, DHS established the chemical facilities 
anti-terrorism standards as a requirement of the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act of 2007 to address the highest risk chemical facilities in the 
country.103 While IP should be based around assessing chemical facilities support for the 
overall infrastructure functions essential to the nation, the assessment and protection of 
these facilities is measured by risk of theft and infiltration. See Figure 10 for a list of 
seven standards. 
  
                                                 
102 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection—DHS Efforts to Assess 
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103 Office of the Inspector General, Effectiveness of the Infrastructure Security Compliance Division’s 
Management Practices to Implement the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program 
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Figure 10.  DHS Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards Risk-based 
Performance Standards 
 
From Office of the Inspector General, Effectiveness of the Infrastructure Security 
Compliance Division’s Management Practices to Implement the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards Program (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2013), 14, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-55_Mar13.pdf. 
Each of these seven performance standards shown in Figure 10 (there are 18 total) 
for chemical facilities are related to physical security of the facility against attack, 
unauthorized access, sabotage, or theft of materials. None of the 18 standards relate to the 
functionality of the facility or the interdependencies with other facilities. Also, no 
standard relating to information sharing or coordination with other infrastructure facilities 
exists. The Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program within the 
DHS National Protection and Preparedness Director was allocated a $93 million budget 
in 2012 for personnel costs, training, systems, and program support.104 Even with a list of 
security criteria that only relate to the physical security of individual facilities, the DHS 
Office of the Inspector General found that “more than five years since the program was 
                                                 
104 Office of the Inspector General, Effectiveness of the Infrastructure Security Compliance Division’s 
Management Practices to Implement the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program, 11. 
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created, almost $443 million had been appropriated, and no facility has gone through the 
entire CFATS regulatory process.”105 
Facilities within the DHS CI chemical subsector serve as an example of facilities 
that have been designated as “critical” yet protective measures funded by DHS only 
pertain to physical security at individual facilities. Even with the very limited scope of 
protective measures that do not address infrastructure as an interconnected and 
interdependent system, DHS’s internal report found that no facility was even completing 
the entire CFATS evaluation process. None of these protective measures link back to the 
overarching concept of CI being facilities so essential that their destruction would cause 
cascading impacts across the entire nation. 
F. POTENTIAL SOLUTION—REFINE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
DESIGNATION CRITERIA 
DHS is required to manage risks to CI by NIPP, PPD-21, and the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 but “DHS is not positioned to manage an integrated and coordinated 
government-wide approach for CI vulnerability assessment activities as called for by the 
NIPP.”106 A remedy for this problem is reducing the overall number of facilities across 
the 16 CI sectors. Numerous agencies and DHS components conduct infrastructure risk 
assessments and have IP missions that overlap because too many different facilities are 
categorized as critical. Removing the low-risk and non-critical facilities can simplify 
interagency coordination by reducing the total number of locations, tasks, and national-
level assessments. The corrective actions recommended by GAO include refining 
vulnerability assessment tools, consistently collecting information, avoiding duplication, 
and facilitating information sharing.107 Each of these goals would be easier to accomplish 
with a smaller number of CI facilities to assess. 
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IV. WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM WITH 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION POLICY? 
We must not start our thinking on war with the tools of war-with the 
airplanes, tanks, ships, and those who crew them. These tools are 
important and have their place, but they cannot be our starting point, nor 
can we allow ourselves to see them as the essence of war. Fighting is not 
the essence of war, nor even a desirable part of it. The real essence is 
doing what is necessary to make the enemy accept our objectives as his 
objectives.  
— Colonel John A. Warden, The Enemy as a System108 
 
A. MILITARY THEORY AND TARGET SELECTION 
The primary component of the DHS CI protection mission is protecting facilities 
from terrorist attacks stemming from the PPD-21 requirement to “reduce the risks to 
critical infrastructure by physical means or defense cyber measures to intrusions, attacks, 
or the effects of natural or man-made disasters.”109 To create a plan for the protection of 
critical facilities, the intentions of the enemy need to be understood. It is unlikely that a 
terrorist group operating in the United States has the capability to destroy a nationally 
significant infrastructure target that provides life-sustaining services at the national level 
(a RAND terrorism risk modeling report found negligible terrorism risk outside top eight 
Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) cities and 10-ton explosive as the least likely type 
of bombing attack110). These nationally significant facilities would be attractive targets 
for an enemy nation-state with ballistic missile and airpower capabilities but the DHS IP 
measure are also not designed around defense from military air attacks. The current 
terrorist threat comes from homegrown violent extremist and supporters of violent 
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 46
extremist groups who are motivated to inflict mass casualties by killing and injuring as 
many people as possible in a location accessible to the public.111 These individuals or 
small groups of individuals lack the intelligence, organizational coordination, manpower, 
and resources to conduct a strategic war campaign against nationally significant 
infrastructure targets. 
The current CI protection mission is convoluted because protection efforts are 
based around two competing strategies, which are terror groups interested in inflicting 
mass casualty versus organized militaries (or well-equipped paramilitary organizations) 
conducting strategic operations with the intent to cripple the nation’s most significant 
infrastructure systems. Current policies group these two different types of adversarial 
action into a single protection mission when they are distinctly different. 
B. METHODS OF ATTACK 
Different military strategies have been taught and utilized by the United States 
and other modern militaries. These types of attacks are based around differing strategic 
objectives, the ability to gather intelligence, military capabilities, and available resources. 
1. Figures and Tables 
The Air Corps Tactical School theory112 states targeted strikes to specific 
facilities or functions can result in economic destruction would lead to social collapse and 
defeat of the enemy. Lt Col Peter Faber, an expert in strategic aerial warfare, theorizes 
targeted strikes provide the means to win a war in the following manner:  
1. Modern nations rely on industrial and economic systems for production 
of weapons and supplies for their armed forces, for manufacture of 
products, and provision of services to sustain life. Disruption or paralysis 
of these systems undermines both the enemy’s capability and will to fight.  
                                                 
111 “Countering Violent Extremism,” July 20, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/topic/countering-violent-
extremism.  
112 Howard D. Belote, “Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School–What Goes Around Comes 
Around,” AirPower Journal, Fall 1999, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/ 
fal99/belote.html.  
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2. Industrial and economic systems contain critical points whose 
destruction will break down these systems if bombs can be delivered with 
adequate accuracy to do this. 
3. Air strike forces can penetrate air defenses without unacceptable losses 
and destroy selected targets.  
4. Proper selection of vital targets in the industrial/economic/social 
structure of an industrialized nation, and their subsequent destruction by 
air attack, can lead to fatal weakening of an industrialized enemy nation 
and to victory through air power.113 
Winning a war by employing targeted strikes requires knowledge of the enemy’s key 
systems, intelligence to select the critical points, forces capable of making the attack, and 
forces that can avoid unacceptable losses.114 
2. Series Warfare 
Unlike targeted strikes that are carried out with aircrafts, in series warfare, “a 
commander concentrates forces in order to prevail against a single vulnerable part of the 
enemy’s forces. If the commander prevails, the army regroups forces and moves on to 
attack another point in the enemy’s defense. While the attacking army regroups, the 
enemy army may counter attack or move to defend another position.”115 This back and 
worth process is termed “serial warfare” because of the “subsequent maneuver and 
counter-maneuver, attack and counterattack, and movement and pause.”116 Series warfare 
continues until either army does not have the capabilities or will to continue fighting. 
3. Parallel Attack 
A combination of targeted attacks and series warfare is the concept of parallel 
attacks against a wide array of essential systems. The most important element of the 
parallel attack is understanding the targets that hold the highest value to the enemy 
system. Once the system is understood, a strategy must be developed to damage or 
                                                 
113 Peter Faber, “Competing Theories of Airpower: A Language for Analysis,” AirPower Journal, 
April 30, 1996, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/%20airchronicles/presentation/faber.html.  
114 Ibid. 
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paralyze it. A nation is likely to have a “small number of vital targets at the strategic level 
because most systems only cause localized disruptions if damaged.”117 The nationally 
significant targets “tend to be small, very expensive, have few backups, and are hard to 
repair”118 that aligns with the same concept of CI, which is interdependent systems that 
cause system-wide failures. 
Figure 11.  Process of Actions during Strategic Warfare 
 
 
If a significant percentage of key targets are struck in parallel, the damage 
becomes insurmountable. The enemy can mitigate the effects of serial attacks by 
“dispersing the location of critical targets, by increasing the defenses of targets that are 
likely to be attacked, concentrating resources to repair damage to single targets, or 
conducting a counter offensive.”119 The purpose of the parallel attack is to deprive the 
enemy of the ability to respond effectively to mitigate the impacts of the attack. The 
higher the number of significant targets destroyed during each set of strikes, the higher 
the likelihood of debilitating the enemy.120 The current DHS strategy of protecting CI by 
                                                 





adding redundancies and hardening targets directly relates to the concept of identifying 
and protecting key targets from the parallel attack. 
4. Mass Casualty Attack 
Online publications, such as The Islamic State’s Dabiq and Al Qaeda’s Inspire, 
have provided instructions for supporters to carry out homemade conventional explosive 
and small arms attacks. The intent of these attacks is to inflict as many deaths and injuries 
as possible by targeting crowded public areas and special events. An example of this 
tactic was the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon bombing attack where two radicalized 
individuals produced small homemade explosives that were detonated at the crowded 
finish line area of the city’s annual marathon.  
Figure 12.  Process of Actions Occurring during  
Conventional Terrorist Attacks 
 
 
The likely purpose of these attacks on the American public was to kill and injure 
people to cause fear rather than being a focused strike on an infrastructure component 
that would result in cascading impacts to the systems that underpin the functions of the 
United States. 
5. Mutually Assured Destruction 
The underlying theory of nuclear war between multiple industrial nations with 
nuclear weapons is that if a nuclear weapon were detonated, mutually assured destruction 
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would occur to all nations involved due to counter nuclear attacks. In the end, nobody 
would win the nuclear war because the causalities and damage on every side would be 
catastrophic. 
The mutually assured destruction (MAD) concept is applicable to planning for CI 
protection based on the size of an attack that would be required to damage a critical 
system. The massive amount (a theoretical 10,000 pounds or more of explosives 
exceeding the size of the Oklahoma City federal building attack) that would be needed to 
destroy a large dam or multiple simultaneous attacks on electrical power plants would be 
of scope large enough to assure the destruction of the nation-state, paramilitary army, or 
terrorist group responsible. Is it realistic to plan for, or protect against attacks, of this 
scope at infrastructure facilities when it is unlikely that terrorist groups could utilize such 
a large quantity of explosives? Increasing physical security at a facility with taller fences 
and stricter identification checks designed to stop a small-scale and unlikely terrorist 
attack would do nothing to protect against a ballistic missile strike, which is the most 
realistic, but very unlikely, threat to the facility. 
C. WARDEN’S FIVE-RING SYSTEM THEORY 
Countries are inverted pyramids that rest precariously on their strategic 
innards—their leadership, communications, key production, infrastructure, 
and population. If a country is paralyzed strategically, it is defeated and 
cannot sustain its fielded forces though they may be fully intact. 
— Colonel John Warden, Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century121 
Warden’s five-ring system theory is a concentric ring concept of targeting the 
central rings that hold the highest strategic value (see Figure 13; the central ring is also 
the smallest target). In the rings beyond the highest value targets, the targets become 
larger and have less strategic significance. Warden selected five general systems that he 
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believed were key centers of gravity to exploit against any enemy (leadership, organic 
essentials,122 infrastructure, population, and fielded military forces).  
Figure 13.  Warden’s Five-Ring System Theory 
 
From Clayton Chun, “John Warden’s Five Ring Model and the Indirect Approach to 
War,” ETH Zurich, June 1, 2008, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/ 
Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=57408. 
Warden’s model provides a framework for how to defeat an enemy through 
destruction of critical components instead of engaging in combat with a conventional 
army.123 This strategy is only effective if the attacker has the ability to identify and 
strategically plan how to destroy each of those systems in a specific order.124 Warden’s 
theory aligns with DHS’s tiered approach to IP and the NADB. If military theorists 
trained in Warden’s approach looked at how to identify and protect domestic 
infrastructure, they would likely think of it through a concentric ring-based system. 
The flaw in applying Warden’s theory to domestic IP is that the strategic values of 
the targets within each ring are not static. Leadership can be adaptive and resilient, the 
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relationships between systems can be too complex to understand completely, and most 
adversaries lack the resources necessary to conduct parallel attacks across a vast array of 
domestic targets.125 These same problems are also evident in current CI protection 
policies because as facilities are hardened, demand for services changes, populations 
shift, different technologies are developed, and the criticality of infrastructure facilities 
also changes. Compounding the problem, the concentric ring system is ineffective if the 
wrong facilities are identified as being the key targets. Placing non-essential system into 
the central rings creates a large core rather than concentric rings that delineate the 
importance of different assets. 
Warden’s theory depends on taking a snapshot of the enemy system and carefully 
analyzing it to understand the weaknesses in the system. This same strategy is not an 
effective manner of analysis of vulnerabilities to domestic infrastructure over an extended 
period of time. Conducting assessments of infrastructure and creating tiered lists of 
resources would provide strategic planners with the critical systems at that point in time 
but as the value of targets changes, the target list would become less and less useful. The 
effectiveness of the target list would also be contingent on the how completely it captured 
the entirety of the system. Identifying individual facilities would only be useful if their 
destruction caused the cascading impacts that could cripple the essential functions of the 
enemy. The process of identifying these interdependencies would require an analysis of 
the entire system to determine the points of failure and then tracing the failures back to 
identify individual facilities as key targets. The current DHS policy identifies sectors of 
infrastructure and then identifies individual facilities within the separate sectors. This 
approach lacks the key “enemy as a system” concept of understanding the 
interdependencies and identifying the specific points of failure in the system. These 
points of failure are not broad sets of infrastructure systems; they are small areas of high 
strategic value in the center of the concentric rings. 
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D. TERRORISM DIFFERS FROM STRATEGIC WARFARE 
The September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City and the Pentagon, the March 
11, 2004 train bombings in Madrid, the July 7, 2005 London transit bombings, and the 
2010 attempted Atlantic airline bombings with ink cartridges concealing explosives are 
all examples of how the most sophisticated terrorist attacks in recent history are different 
from strategic warfare.  
These attacks were not targeted strikes against essential systems intended to 
cripple an enemy population. The Madrid126 and London127 attacks targeted 
transportation systems and occurred along busy transit pathways. However, the attacks 
did not target the key hubs of the system or cause cascading outages through the system. 
The same attacks carried out in more carefully selected locations could have caused 
wider impacts to the transportation system and inflicted a greater number of causalities. A 
strategic targeted strike intended to cripple transportation system would have occurred in 
a different manner. 
The four major terrorist attacks also did not follow the concepts of series warfare 
in which an attack is mounted, resources are regrouped, and a subsequent attack occurs. 
Following the plane crashes at the WTC and the Pentagon, no plan or operation was in 
place for a second wave of attacks. If the 9/11 attacks were part of a series warfare 
strategy, a second operation would have already been underway but was not.128 The same 
was true of the European transit bombings where coordinated attacks occurred but no 
second or third wave of subsequent attacks were prepared. 
While the 9/11 attacks and the transit bombings targeted multiple locations, these 
attacks were not examples of a parallel attack strategy either. A parallel attack 
simultaneously strikes the key facilities in an area causing a crippling effect across the 
entire system. These significant terrorist attacks did not cripple the individual systems 
                                                 
126 “Madrid Train Attacks: How the Attacks Happened,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/ 
457000/457031/html/default.stm. 
127 “London Bombings Toll Rises to 37,” July 7, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/4661059.stm.  
128 David Stout, “Original Plan for 9/11 Attacks Involved 10 Planes, Panel Says,” The New York 
Times, June 16, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/16/politics/16CND-REPORT.html. 
 54
that they targeted (e.g., striking the Pentagon did not shut down the U.S. military) or 
cause cascading impacts that crippled other essential systems. Each attack caused isolated 
impacts to a single component of the infrastructure system. 
The timing and location of the 9/11 and transit attacks also demonstrate that the 
attacks were not intended to cause the maximum number of causalities possible. While 
50,000 people worked in the original WTC towers, the attack occurred before 9:00 AM 
when most people get to work.129 Instead of potentially killing 50,000 people, 2,977 
people died when the plane struck at 8:46 AM.130 Al Qaeda operatives spent years 
planning the 9/11 attack so it seems unlikely that they would have chosen to strike before 
9:00 AM if the intent was to carry out a mass causality attack that would kill as many 
people as possible. 




                                                 
129 “The World Trade Center—Facts and Figures,” accessed July 22, 2015, https://www.nysm.nysed. 
gov/wtc/about/facts.html.  
130 “September 11th Fast Facts,” March 27, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-
anniversary-fast-facts/.  
 55
Based on Warden’s concentric rings theory, each of the terrorist attacks targeted 
the outermost rings that consist of the population and the field forces. If the terrorist 
attacks were strategic in nature, they would have likely tried to target the inner rings to 
cause more disruption across the entire country. Attacks targeting the inner rings could 
have been the New York Stock Exchange or the White House. 
E. TERRORISTS HISTORICALLY DO NOT TARGET CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Improvised explosives, vehicle borne explosives, and firearms were the primary 
weapon in more than 99% of terrorist attacks according to the Mineta Transportation 
Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence study of multiple 
terrorism attack databases.131 While these types of attacks have the power to kill people 
and cause damage to property, they do not have the destructive capability to cease the 
functions of most CI facilities, such as power plants, telecommunications hubs, dams, 
water treatment facilities, regional transportation systems, and so on. Why is protection 
of facilities providing essential infrastructure functions a primary goal of DHS when 
these facilities are rarely targeted, and do not align with the motivation for terrorist 
groups? 
Protecting CI against terrorist attacks is a primary mission of DHS, but the 
execution of this mission is flawed in many ways. Current policies and procedures look at 
targets in a different way than how a terrorist would select a target for attack. The 
protection of potential targets is designed around methods of attack that are different 
from how the majority of terrorist attacks are carried out. The consequences of an attack 
on a target are assessed based on the number of deaths, injuries, and dollars rather than 
the public exposure or alignment with an ideology that the target represents. Following 
similar ideas as the book, From the Terrorist’s Point of View, rather than refine the 
approach to identify threats, current practice is to cast a larger and larger net, which 
requires greater resources for smaller results. 
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The mission of protecting CI can be refined through a psychological approach to 
evaluate why a terrorist attacks, a likely method of attack, and the type of target that 
would align with the desired results. Unlike convention warfare, terrorists view their 
tactics as a driver for social change making the highest value targets different from those 
chosen by a conventional army commander.  
F. FEAR—THE CRITICAL STRATEGY OF TERRORISM 
Terrorism experts like Bruce Hoffman argue that large-scale terrorist attacks with 
weapons of mass destruction (which have never occurred) and large events like the 9/11 
attacks on the WTC are counter-productive strategies for terrorist groups. Small-scale 
attacks cause “disproportionately enormous consequences, generate fear and alarm, and 
thus serve the terrorists’ purposes just as well as a larger weapon or more ambitious 
attack.”132 According to Breckenridge and Zimbardo, “a heightened sense of crisis can 
lead to political disaffection and diminished confidence in the government”133 and the 
resulting fear and anxiety across the population from the attack aligns better with 
terrorist’s goals of political or social changes than inflicting mass destruction or 
causalities. For example, Osama Bin Laden’s attack on the United Stares prior to 
September 11, 2001 were also attempting to erode public support and cause political 
pressure to remove U.S. forces from the Middle East. These attacks were intended to 
erode the general public’s support of U.S. leaders, not to kill the entire American 
population. “It is not surprising that fear and apprehension can have considerable political 
consequences. Affective influences on attention, memory, and judgment contribute to the 
widespread experience of disproportionate vulnerability and looming threat appraisal that 
make terrorism a more psychologically complex phenomenon.”134 
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G. OSAMA BIN LADEN’S STRATEGY—OCCUPIED COUNTRY 
STRATEGY 
While the conventional army wants to conquer territory at the lowest cost, Osama 
Bin Laden’s strategy was the opposite. Instead of wanting to invade America and take 
over resources, his plan was to draw the United States into a prolonged and unwinnable 
military conflict in the Middle East that would eventually bankrupt this country. In 2004, 
Bin Laden delivered the message that  
all that we have to do is to send two Mujahedin to the farthest point East to 
raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qa’ida in order to make the 
generals race there to cause America to suffer human economic and 
political losses without their achieving for it anything of note other than 
some benefits to their private companies. This is in addition to our having 
experience in using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to fight 
tyrannical superpowers as we alongside the Mujahedin bled Russia for 10 
years until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat. So we 
are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of 
bankruptcy.135 
Bid Laden’s motivation for waging this style of war was because he viewed his 
territory as being under occupation and the strategy was designed to make the continued 
deployment of U.S. troops unsustainable. In his videotaped messages, Bin Laden states, 
“we fight you because we are free men who don’t sleep under oppression. We want to 
restore freedom to our Nation and just as you lay waste to our Nation, so shall we lay 
waste to yours.”136 Bin Laden’s message showed no interest in invading the United 
States or eradicating the entire American public. 
This freedom fighter warfare strategy is problematic for a conventional military 
because of the imbalance between the extreme expense of a maintaining a remotely 
deployed modern military force with the minimal expense of conducting gorilla 
operations with a small number of operatives and homemade explosives. 
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H. HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE VERSUS HOMEGROWN 
VIOLENT EXTREMISTS 
The same imbalances in the costs of waging warfare exist between the thousands 
of entities in the law enforcement arm of the homeland security enterprise and the 
homegrown violent extremists who self-radicalize to jihad against domestic targets. 
In 2010, Al Qaeda transitioned to a “death by a thousand cuts” strategy, which 
focused on a high volume of low cost attacks. One example is the plot to use bombs in 
printer cartridges to destroy planes. This plot had an estimated cost of $4,200137 but 
would have done hundreds of millions of dollars in damage to the aviation industry by 
destroying two Bowing 747 aircraft valued at more than $200 million each,138 and 
causing subsequent groundings of other flights.139 Similar to the problems with the 
military occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, the cost of maintaining thousands of 
intelligence analysts and law enforcement officers dedicated to counter-terrorists is 
unsustainably expensive, while the cost of conducting small-scale terrorist operations is a 
reasonable expense for Al Qaeda. 
Both Al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine and the Islamic State’s Dabiq offer similar 
guidance to future jihadists to conduct small attack close to home, such as the message in 
Dabiq No. 6 of “the Muslims will continue to defy the kāfir war machine, flanking the 
crusaders on their own streets and bringing the war back to their own soil.”140 
I. TERRORIST’S TARGET SELECTION—MAXIMUM EXPOSURE NOT 
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS 
The use of fear as a tactic makes the target selection for a terrorist attack even 
more complicated to determine. “The potential for misplaced threat-related priorities may 
                                                 
137 Matthew Cole, “Al Qaeda Promises U.S. Death by a ‘Thousand Cuts’” ABC News, November 21, 
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represent a particularly daunting challenge for the United States, which can anticipate a 
vast array of possible terrorist targets and methods, but relatively to many areas of 
conflict, it has had little historical experience with terrorist attacks.”141 
Without a framework of past experience with terrorism, DHS likely used 
conventional military strategies to identify domestic CI. One of these sources was likely 
Sun Tzu’s war strategy, which centered on defeating the enemy with least amount of 
effort possible. This same strategy has been utilized by the United States in the air 
bombing campaigns against Iraq. Using Warden’s theory of concentric rings, the highest 
value targets (the leadership and most CI) are targeted to cripple the remainder of the 
country. Precise attacks to the strategic core leave the population mostly unharmed.  
Terrorism is not about conquering the enemy or using strategic strikes. Since the 
objectives of a terrorist group are different from an army, CI facilities have lower value 
and are less likely to be targeted. The intent of the terrorist is to send a message and gain 
maximum exposure but not necessary cripple the functions of the target. Of the 125,087 
incidents in the Global Terrorism Database, more than 74,000 had no injuries and 90% 
had less than 10 injuries from the attack (Figure 15). Nearly 63,000 also had no fatalities 
and more than 90% of incidents also had less than 10 fatalities (Figure 15). This small 
number of injuries and deaths occurred even though 59,982 of the incidents were 
bombings/explosions targeting primarily private citizens, businesses, military, and 
government. As shown in Figure 17, less than .5% of the attacks were against 
telecommunications systems, which are a critical component of infrastructure systems 
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Figure 15.  Fatalities from Terrorist Attacks 
 
From “Global Terrorism Database, Search Results: 141966 Incidents,” accessed July 22, 
2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.  
The 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo Subway using ricin is an example 
of a terrorist attacked that occurred at a critical transportation facility but the intent of the 
attack was not to cripple the transportation system. The doomsday cult held a belief that 
the Japanese government was corrupt and responsible for a pending apocalypse, so a 
shocking attack would cause the people of Japan to prescribe to the Aum Shinrikyo 
beliefs. Regardless of the reason, this attack was destructive and deadly, but it was not an 
attack on an infrastructure system; it was an attack on a mass gathering of people inside a 
vulnerable area.142 
In Osama Bin Laden’s video tape released taking credit for the 9/11 attack, he 
said, “the Twin Towers were legitimate targets, they were supporting U.S. economic 
power. These events were great by all measurement. What was destroyed were not only 
the towers, but the towers of morale in that country.”143 Bin Laden’s statement makes it 
clear that the attack was not intended to destroy the American economy or collapse the 
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143 David Bamber, “Bin Laden: Yes, I Did It,” The Telegraph, November 11, 2001, 
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infrastructure of New York City; the purpose of the attack was to scare and damage the 
morale of the American people. Like the Irish Republic Army (IRA), and Aum 
Shinrikyo, the attack was a message, not a targeted strike on CI systems. 
Another terrorist group focused on the message of the attack rather than the death 
and destruction caused by it was the IRA. It was a standard practice of the IRA to call in 
and report bombings prior to the explosion because the intent of attack was not to harm 
civilians.144 As demonstrated in Figure 16, in 74,838 of 125,087 attacks (59.8%), no 
injuries occurred. Mass injuries harming more than 100 people occurred less than .08% 
of the time. In the majority of cases, the goal of a terrorist attack has been to send a 
message rather than cause widespread harm. 
Figure 16.  Injuries from Terrorist Attacks 
  
From “Global Terrorism Database, Search Results: 141966 Incidents,” accessed July 22, 
2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.  
When considering the facilities at risk for a terrorist attack, the CI protection 
policies do not align to most frequent targets for terrorist groups around the world. 
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Shown in Figure 17, the most common targets are private citizens, police, military, and 
government (general and diplomatic), accounting for 70% of all attacks. Facilities 
providing purely infrastructure functions, such as telecommunications and utilities, were 
targeted in 4.4% of attacks.  
Figure 17.  Terrorist Attack Targets by Type 
 
From “Global Terrorism Database, Search Results: 141966 Incidents,” accessed July 22, 
2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.  
J. TERRORIST’S MOTIVATION—ATTENTION AND REWARD 
Terrorists killing innocent people does not seem like rational actions to most 
people in the Western world. Conventional thinking about terrorist tactics and targets 
would suggest that they want to inflict the most damage on as many people as possible. 
For this reason, standard practices for protecting CI include building fences, installing 
traffic bollards, monitoring security cameras, and screening visitors at locations, such as 
government buildings, commercial offices, stadium, hotels, casinos, sports arenas, 
museums, and so on.  
The motivation for terrorist attacks is also distinctly different from a targeted 
military strike designed to cripple the infrastructure systems of the enemy. The attack is 
not about destroying the function of the physical system; it is about sending a message to 
society. The functions of a “terrorist attack can include: 
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 showing that the authorities are weak and vulnerable to attacks 
 proving that the authorities are unable to control events 
 lowering allegiances to the authority institutions 
 creating a sense of instability and lawlessness in society 
 creating a sense of helplessness among the population 
 giving the impression of terrorist organizations as being very powerful 
 giving the impression that there will be no end to terrorist attacks until a 
final victory”145 
These functions of a terrorist attack are not exclusive to Islamic extremists. The same 
fundamental goals motivated groups like the IRA, Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo Subway 
Ricin Attack, and lone-wolf attacks, such as the Oklahoma City Bombing.  
The current CI protection policies that aim to prevent all types of attacks are in 
many ways similar to the difficulty DHS has with identifying individuals as terrorists.146 
The focus on protecting CI has been identifying all possible targets, building better 
barriers, installing more security and surveillance systems, and gathering large amounts 
of real time intelligence. In the same manner that stopping every potential terrorist the 
moment before they strike is unrealistic, it is also impossible to protect every potential 
target from every possible type of attack. CI protection should focus on determining the 
most likely targets and realistic forms of attack that would align with the goals of the 
terrorists groups. In most cases, the likely targets are not CI facilities.  
K. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CRITICAL AND TARGETABLE FACILITIES 
A potential point of confusion in the CI protection mission is the difference 
between facilities that are part of a CI system and facilities that are attractive targets for 
terrorism. While a water treatment plant might be a CI facility, its remote location, 
inaccessibility to the general public, and lack of people at the site, might not make it an 
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146 Johnson, “Remarks By Secretary Jeh Charles Johnson On “The New Realities of Homeland 
Security” As Part of the Landon Lecture Series on Public Issues—As Prepared For Delivery.” 
 64
attractive target for a terrorist. Inversely, an outdoor concert might not serve any 
infrastructure function but due to the large crowds and open access to the area, it could be 
an attractive terrorist target. By looking at the types of facilities attacked in the Global 
Terrorism Database (Figure 18), a difference can bee seen between a “targetable” facility 
and a “critical infrastructure” facility. 
Figure 18.  Explosive Attacks by Target Type in 62,921 Incidents 
 
From “Global Terrorism Database, Search Results: 141966 Incidents,” accessed July 22, 
2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.  
Looking more specifically at domestic terrorist attacks that have caused 1–10 
fatalities or injuries (Figure 19), the Global Terrorism Database includes 149 incidents 
from 1973 to 2014. The two attacks targeting utilities include the 2012 attempted 
bombing of a gas pipeline by a sovereign citizen in Plano City, Texas,147 and the 1976 
utility targeted by the New World Liberation Front.148 The majority of attacks target 
government, police, private citizens, educational institutions, and businesses. 
Infrastructure systems including airports, transportation, and utilities are seldom the 
target. 
  
                                                 




Figure 19.  Domestic Attacks Causing 1–10 Fatalities/Injuries 
 
From “Global Terrorism Database, Search Results: 141966 Incidents,” accessed July 22, 
2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.  
Since 1970, seven terrorist attacks have occurred in the United States that have 
killed or injured more than 101 people, as shown in Table 2. These incidents include the 
2013 Boston, MA Marathon Bombing, the 9/11 attack at the Pentagon in Arlington, VA, 
the 9/11 attack at the WTC in New York, NY, the 9/11 plane crash in Shanksville, PA, 
the 1996 Olympic bombing in Atlanta, GA, the Oklahoma City federal building bombing 
in 1995, and the 1984 biological (salmonella) attack on The Dalles, Oregon.149 The target 
of each bombing was selected to send a specific message from the group responsible for 
the attack. In each case, the attack did not cause a significant disruption to CI or the 
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Table 2.   Terrorist Attacks Causing More than 101 Deaths or Injuries  
in the United States 





acceptance in radical 
Islamist 
communities; wage 
war against the 
United States150  






Localized closures at 
site of explosion (7–
10 days), city-wide 
closures due to law 
enforcement 
operations while 
searching for suspects 
Partial—Attack 
did not harm 












military forces from 
countries in the 
Middle East by 
striking domestic 
U.S. target with a 
high profile attack  
189 fatalities, 106 
injuries, significant 
damage to a 




and U.S. government 
functions had 
minimal disruptions 
to critical operations 
No—other than 
killing/injuring 
people at the 
site of the 







military forces from 
countries in the 
Middle East by 
striking domestic 
U.S. target with a 
high profile attack; 
cause widespread 
fear in public and 








functions at the site of 





minimal disruption  
No—other than 
killing/injuring 
people at the 
site of the 






military forces from 
countries in the 
Middle East by 
striking domestic 
U.S. target with a 
high profile attack; 
final target unknown 
40 fatalities (crew 
and passengers of 
AA Flight 77) 
None No—plane 
crashed prior to 
reaching 
intended target 
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of Olympic Games 














people at the 
site of the 









government for gun 
control and Waco, 
TX Branch Davidian 
standoff (attack 
occurred on 2-year 
anniversary)151 
168 fatalities, 650 
injuries, significant 
damage to targeted 
building 
Localized disruptions 
at site of attack; local, 
state, and federal 
government 
continued to function; 











Sicken the local 
population prior to 
election to allow 
Rajneeshee Group 
candidate to win 
election152 
0 fatalities, 751 
injured, no damage 
to buildings 





As these seven attacks demonstrate, targeting and injuring a large number of 
people does not align with attacking a facility that provides essential infrastructure 
functions to the nation or region. In each case, the disruptions to essential infrastructure 
services were nonexistent or minimal in even the immediate areas where the attacks 
occurred.  
Why does CI protection policy focus on large-scale attacks to CI facilities when 
they have not been the target of the largest domestic terrorist attacks, and were rarely the 
target of the 130,000 terrorist attacks across the world over the last 50 years? 
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L. TARGETABLE LOCATIONS AND EVENTS 
Terrorists are interested in attacking locations that are accessible, crowded with 
people, have minimal security, and will draw the interest of the general public and the 
media. The six major terrorist attacks on the United States fit these criteria. For example, 
the Olympic Park in Atlanta, Georgia was accessible to the general public and had no 
security screenings. On the local scale, the 10 restaurant salad bars targeted in the 1984 
salmonella attacks were easily accessible to the terrorist group, frequented by the public, 
and the consequences were intended to be widespread across the community. The most 
recent attack at the Boston Marathon targeted an event open to the general public, did not 
have security screenings, drew large crowds, and would draw media attention at the local, 
regional, and national levels. The Boston Marathon attack did not directly target 
transportation or specific infrastructure functions in Boston with the intent of crippling 
the city’s essential functions. 
A terrorist interest lies not in the functions that a facility provides, such as a high 
demand electrical substation responsible for regional power generation, but instead 
focuses on accessible areas that are attractive targets for attacks. Targetability is the 
primary motivation of the terrorist over the criticality of the facility. 
M. IMPLICATIONS FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
MISSION 
Preventing terrorism at the individual level requires developing methods to 
identify individuals as they ascend up the staircase to terrorism and stop them before they 
reach the highest level where an attack is planned or carried out. This approach is rooted 
in the cause rather than the consequence, and can be applied to the CI mission, which 
should evaluate the motivation and value to a terrorist when determining the risks of 
terrorist attacks on CI facilities. In the same way that it is impossible to stop every 
individual from carrying out a terrorist attack, it is impossible to protect every facility 
from every threat. Evaluating if a facility is a viable target, determining how to protect 
against the most likely form of attack, and then deciding if a reasonable protective 
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measure exists that would be a more efficient method of protecting, or not protecting, CI 
facilities. 
Colonel Warden’s The Enemy as a System153 addresses infrastructure as the 
systems that are so important that “even minor damage to essential industries may lead 
the command element to make concessions.”154 The concessions may come because:  
 Damage to organic essentials/essential systems (CI) leads to the collapse 
of the system.155 
 Damage to organic essentials/essential systems (CI) makes it physically 
difficult or impossible to maintain a certain policy or to fight.156  
 Damage to organic essentials/essential systems (CI) has internal political 
or economic repercussions that are too costly to bear.”157 
The homeland security definition of CI is very similar to Warden’s concept of organic 
essentials. DHS defines CI as “the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or 
virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a 
debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination thereof.”158 Warden states that organic essentials cause a 
collapse of the system, which is the same as saying “debilitating effects.” The systems 
that make it impossible to maintain a fight are the systems “vital to security, national 
public health, and safety.” The organic essentials that cause great political and economic 
repercussion are the same as those that endanger the “national economic security.” The 
current definition that DHS uses to describe CI closely aligns with Warden’s organic 
essentials to target during strategic warfare. 
The 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan operates under the assumption 
that “both domestic and international critical infrastructure assets represent potential 
prime targets for adversaries. Given the deeply rooted nature of these goals and 
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motivations, critical infrastructure likely will remain highly attractive targets for state and 
non-state actors and others with ill intent.”159 Based on this research, IP efforts are 
framed under an inaccurate assumption of the terrorist threat to them. CI protection 
policies should not be the focus on large-scale attacks to facilities when they have not 
been the target of the largest domestic terrorist attacks and have rarely been the target of 
the 130,000 terrorist attacks across the world over the last 50 years. Terrorists have not 
previously targeted infrastructure and are unlikely to change their intentions in the future, 
which means that the way DHS views protecting infrastructure and preventing terrorism 
needs to be reformed. 
Much of the current IP analysis conducted by DHS focuses on the attributes of 
individual facilities within separate functional sectors or subsectors of infrastructure. 
Military warfare strategies hinge on understanding the entire system that allows an enemy 
to function and then targeting the weaknesses that causes failures across the system. The 
focus on individual facilities that provide separate functions lacks the network-wide 
viewpoint necessary to understand criticalities and assign priorities within the entire 
infrastructure system, which prevents DHS from accomplishing the statutory protection 
mission. 
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V. DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES DHS CURRENTLY 
DEFINES AS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE 
UNEXPECTED RESULTS 
The WTC, the Las Vegas Strip casinos, and the toxic contamination of the Elk 
River in West Virginia (resulting in a municipal water system outage) all serve as unique 
case studies for challenging the designation of these facilities as CI. Each of these 
facilities would currently be categorized as critical with the 16 infrastructure sectors. The 
facilities that DHS designates as CI should cause debilitating impacts to the nation if 
destroyed, but what if the loss of these facilities did not even have a debilitating impact 
on a local level? The destruction of the original WTC, the destruction of 14 Las Vegas 
Strip casinos, and the chemical contamination of the sole water source in Charleston, 
WV, did not result in result in debilitating local impacts. Inversely, the New York and 
Las Vegas cases unexpectedly lead to positive economic impacts at the local level. 
It should be noted that the loss of human lives can occur with the destruction of 
critical facilities, but the IP mission is not always focused on reducing human loses. In 
2013, 32,719 traffic collision fatalities occurred on roadways160 that fall under the CI 
transportation systems sector but it is the mission of DHS to protect the physical 
transportation infrastructure from terrorist attacks rather than investing resources to 
prevent thousands of annual deaths from occurring during vehicle accidents on the 
highways.161 It is within the scope of DHS mission to assess how a bridge could be 
attacked with explosives by terrorists, but not to assess if installing higher guardrails 
could prevent a car from accidently driving off the bridge. 
The CF sector is an example of facilities currently deemed to be CI, but the 
analysis within the following case studies shows that the buildings were not essential to 
the nation, not single points of failure, and not providing functions upon which other 
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infrastructure systems were to depend. If the CF sector is found to not be critical, it may 
be due to redundant and resilient functions within this sector. As the analysis of the 
Lower Manhattan office market demonstrated, resiliency occurs within the subsectors, 
and as a result, the impacts from facility losses were not nationally, regionally, or even 
locally significant. In New York, when office buildings were destroyed by the 9/11 
attacks, others were readily available to absorb the demand for office space within the 
local market. 
Refining the methodology for how facilities are categorized as critical, or not 
critical, can reduce the total number of CI facilities and the overall complexity of 
evaluating infrastructure. Removing the “critical” designation from facilities that do not 
cause national devastation or cascading effects to other infrastructure can be beneficial by 
allowing DHS to refocus resources on fulfilling the department’s statutory mission of 
protecting essential infrastructure systems. 
A. CASE STUDY: HOW THE LOSS OF WORLD TRADE CENTER WAS 
CRITICAL TO REDEVELOPING LOWER MANHATTAN 
The large brokerage houses that once lined Wall Street and its cavernous 
side streets have spread far and wide in Manhattan, a reflection of how the 
area south of Chambers Street is no longer the dominant financial services 
center it once was. With aging buildings that cannot accommodate huge 
computers, and a declining need for financial companies to be near each 
other, The Street and its neighborhood are mere reminders of what they 
once were. 
— New York Times, 1994162 
 
A steady exodus of banks, brokerage houses and insurance companies in 
recent years has left the capital of capitalism struggling at the very 
moment the economic system it epitomizes is sweeping the planet. 
— Boston Globe, 1996163 
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I think it is inevitable that Downtown [Lower Manhattan] will reinvent 
itself once again. The process is already underway, and I am very 
optimistic about its future. 
— David Rockefeller, 2002164 
 
It’s 1 World Trade Center’s stunning combination of ultra-modern design 
and super-sustainable efficiency that makes it a truly towering 
achievement.  
— WTC.com Marketing Material, 2015 
 
Before September 11, 2001, twin landmark towers stood over the New York City 
skyline (Figure 20) but many of today’s amenities that make Lower Manhattan one of the 
most valuable real estate markets in the world did not. No Fulton Street Transit Center 
existed to organize a jumble of train lines and buses. A walkable park hosting more than 
500 free concerts and waterfront condominiums stretching along the Hudson River also 
did not exist. The Downtown Connection bus line did not bring 800,000 annual riders to 
the area. Thirty billion dollars in combined public and private investment was not 
available to transform the aging WTC into gleaming Class-A Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design (LEED) Platinum165 property. Visitors now stay in nearly 8,000 
hotel rooms, which is triple the number that existed before 2001.166  
The 9/11 attacks were the largest loss of life in American history from terrorism 
but out of the rubble, the economic landscape of Lower Manhattan transformed in a 
manner that would never have been possible without the total loss of WTC. 
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Figure 20.  New York City Skyline in 1995 and 2014 
 
From “ADNY Annual Report 2014,” 2014, http://www.downtownny.com/sites/default/ 
files/Annual%20Report_2015_Final_Web2.pdf.  
1. Commercial Real Estate in Manhattan  
Manhattan is now one of the largest commercial office markets in the world. 
According to 2014 tax records, 1,941 commercial office buildings are valued at $95.6 
billion.167 In 2000, it was assessed at $42.9 billion168 ($58.9 billion adjusted to 2014 
inflation169), which shows the property values have almost doubled in the last 13 years 
since the 9/11 attacks, as shown in Figure 21. 
While the destruction of the WTC caused a major impact to the area, things were 
not in great shape prior to the attack. The year 1995 was the lowest point in a troubled 
decade for Lower Manhattan. Nineteen of the 20 largest stock brokerage houses had 
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closed, 18 of the 20 largest advertising firms had left, and only seven of the original 35 
Broadway theaters remained open.  
The flight of major brokerage houses and investment banks has left the 
neighborhood burdened by old office buildings, with nearly a quarter of 
their space vacant, and with their prospects of luring tenants undermined 
by small floors, poor ventilation and wiring, and outdated architecture. 
Now, while they still need larger and more modern buildings than can be 
found on the blocks around Wall Street, he said the priority of many of the 
securities companies is to find the best deals they can strike on corporate 
real estate, with few reservations about moving off the beaten path in 
Manhattan.170 
Figure 21.  Assessed Property Values in Lower Manhattan between New York 
City Fiscal Year 1991–2000 
 
From Office of Tax Policy, Report on New York City Property Tax FY 2000 (City of New 
York: Department of Finance, 2000), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/finance/downloads/ 
pdf/99pdf/rptsum00.pdf. 
Tax incentives and large amounts of vacant office space allowed tenants outside 
the financial industry to move into Lower Manhattan. In 1996, major tenant additions 
included American Airlines, Pfizer Inc, and Gruner & Jahr USA Publishing. The Mayor’s 
revitalization plan also called for converting office spaces into residential properties. 
Vacancy rates still remained around 70% and the square footage rate for the American 
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Airlines 15-year lease was only $33 ($45.3 adjusted to 2014 inflation) per square/foot 
(the new WTC is currently leasing for $72/ft).171 
At the center of the changing office market, which was transitioning from 
stockbrokers and advertising to a variety of international businesses, was the WTC 
towers. The Twin Towers were designed and built during the heyday of big Wall Street 
brokerage houses and included 7.6 million square feet of space, which were not designed 
for computers and modern office amenities. In 1995, the WTC had a 25.1% vacancy rate, 
which meant that nearly 2 million square feet of space were vacant (an entire 40-story 
high-rise building of empty space).172 The enormous amount of vacant space at the WTC 
negatively impacted real estate and rental prices throughout the entire area. 
2. Loss of the World Trade Center 
In the aftermath of 9/11, without the WTC (original or new) the office space 
market in Manhattan was well positioned for growth. In 2004, the City of New York 
Independent Budget Office, 
forecasted that office employment would regain the peak it had reached in 
2000 by 2010. It appeared that currently vacant space, as well as space 
expected to come on-line during the 2005–2010 period (i.e., Time Warner 
Center, 1 Bryant Park, the New York Times building, and the Bloomberg 
building) would be sufficient capacity to accommodate the new workers 
even while the trade center buildings remained under construction.173  
According to the Independent Budget Office,  
the destruction of the World Trade Center and damage to surrounding 
buildings removed roughly 30 percent of the downtown Class-A office 
inventory. Contrary to expectations, this loss did not result in a spike in 
rents caused by the precipitous decline in supply. Instead, the spreading 
                                                 
171 Mervyn Rothstein, “The Former Mobil Building, Largely Vacant in the 90’s, Gets a New Tenant, 
American Airlines,” The New York Times, October 29, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/30/bus 
iness/former-mobil-building-largely-vacant-90-s-gets-new-tenant-american-airlines.html.  
172 Charles Bagli, “Guardian Insurance’s Plan Adds to Downtown Rebirth,” The New York Times, 
January 8, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/09/nyregion/guardian-insurance-s-plan-adds-to-
downtown-rebirth.html.  
173 City of New York Independent Budget Office, Response to Request to Examine Critical Issues 
Underlying the Planned Rebuilding at the World Trade Center Site (City of New York: Independent 
Budget Office, 2006), http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/stringerwtclet.pdf. 
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impact of employment losses due to the local recession that had started in 
the spring of 2001 and accelerated after the attack, combined with the 
existence of leased but unoccupied ‘shadow space’ in midtown and 
downtown, enabled the real estate market to absorb most of the displaced 
tenants with little effect on rents. Instead, downtown vacancies grew and 
rents fell during 2002 before stabilizing somewhat during 2003 and 
2004.174  
As demonstrated by Figure 22, commercial office leasing peaked in 2002 following the 
loss of the WTC and the need to secure new office spaces. Above-average leasing 
continued in 2003 and 2004. As the new WTC and other redeveloped Lower Manhattan 
properties have opened, office-leasing activity peaked in 2013 and 2014. 
Figure 22.  Lower Manhattan Commercial Leasing Activity 2001–2014 
 
From Alliance for Downtown New York, Inc., Lower Manhattan Real Estate Market 
Overview (New York: Alliance for Downtown, 2014), http://www.downtownny.com/ 
sites/default/files/Q2%202014%20FINAL%20REPORT.pdf. 
3. Creating New Markets 
The criticality of an individual facility, even an enormous commercial facility like 
the original WTC, is nearly impossible to evaluate because even though it seems to be 
counterintuitive, the destruction of the old WTC allowed for the creation of a more 
valuable facility.  
                                                 
174 City of New York Independent Budget Office, Response to Request to Examine Critical Issues 
Underlying the Planned Rebuilding at the World Trade Center Site. 
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The original seven building WTC site contained 11.2 million square feet of office 
space, which accounted for 4% of the total office inventory in Manhattan.175 If the 
original WTC were 100% occupied with the hotel maintaining peak average occupancy, 
the combined site properties would generate a maximum of approximately $545 million 
in annual revenue, as demonstrated in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Original World Trade Center Maximum Leasing Revenue Estimate 
Property Square Footage176 Price per Square-
Foot 
Total (Adjusted to 
2014 Inflation) 
1 World Trade Center 3.8 million $47.00177 $178,600,000 
($245,534,550) 
2 World Trade Center 3.8 million $47.00 $178,600,000 
($245,534,550) 
3 World Trade Center 
(Marriott Hotel) 










5 World Trade Center 
(9-Story Low-rise) 
200,000 (estimated) $47.00 $9,400,000 
($12,922,871) 
6 World Trade Center 
(8-Story Low-rise) 
180,000 (estimated) $47.00 $8,460,000 
($11,630,583) 
7 World Trade Center 
(retail/47 stories) 
1.86 million180 $47.00 $87,420,000 
($120,182,701) 
Total: 14 million181  $544,981,105 
($749,225,591) 
 
                                                 
175 “World Trade Center,” July 9, 2015, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/World_Trade_ 
Center.  
176 “World Trade Center.” 
177 City of New York Independent Budget Office, Response to Request to Examine Critical Issues 
Underlying the Planned Rebuilding at the World Trade Center Site. 
178 HVS Global Hospitality Services, 2012 Manhattan Hotel Market Overview (Mineola, NY: HVS 
Global Hospitality Services, 2012, http://www.hvs.com/Content/3268.pdf.  
179 “Key Office Properties,” accessed July 23, 2015, http://davispartners.com/management/key-office-
properties/.  
180 Federal Emergency Management Agency, World Trade Center 7 Building Performance Study 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2002), http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/ 
documents/3544. 
181 Jason Bram, James Orr, and Carol Raraport, “Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on 
New York City,” FRBNY Economic Policy Review, November 1, 2002, http://www.newyorkfed.org/resear 
ch/epr/02v08n2/0211rapa.pdf. 
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To attract tenants from multi-national corporations, and compete with surrounding 
properties, premium commercial offices are designated as “Class A.” Office space rental 
prices are grouped in three classes by the Building Owners and Managers Association 
International (BOMA). The classes include: 
 Class A—Most prestigious buildings competing for premier office users 
with rents above average for the area. Buildings have high quality standard 
finishes, state of the art systems, exceptional accessibility, and a definite 
market presence. 
 Class B—Buildings competing for a wide range of users with rents in the 
average range for the area. Building finishes are fair to good for the area. 
Building finishes are fair to good for the area and systems are adequate, 
but the building does not compete with Class A at the same price. 
 Class C—Buildings competing for tenants requiring functional space at 
rents below the average for the area.182  
By today’s standards, the original WTC, which was built in the 1970s, would 
likely not meet the criteria for a Class A building, and subsequently, would not demand 
the highest rates and draw the premier tenants paying top dollar. The new WTC is 
designated “Class A” and if the buildings are 100% leased, the total leasing revenue will 









                                                 
182 “Building Class Definitions,” accessed July 23, 2015 http://www.boma.org/research/Pages/build 
ing-class-definitions.aspx.  
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Table 4.   New World Trade Center Maximum Leasing Revenue Estimate 




1 World Trade Center 3 million (Class A office) $72.44183 $217,320,000
2 World Trade Center 2.8 million (Class A office) $72.44 $202,832,000
3 World Trade Center 2.5 million (Class A office) $72.44 $181,100,000
4 World Trade Center 2.3 million (Class A office) $72.44 $166,612,000
7 World Trade Center 1.7 million (Class A office) $72.44 $123,148,000
World Trade Center 
Transportation Hub 
350,000 (retail) $319.00184 $111,650,000
 12.65 million  Total: 
$1,002,665,000
 
The new WTC buildings have the potential to generate $250 million more in 
annual revenue than the old buildings. This total would likely be much higher because the 
old Twin Towers would struggle to compete with surrounding premium office spaces or 
the excess office space across the entire Lower Manhattan office market would 
collectively drive down properties values. Instead, the new WTC buildings are the 
cornerstone of the revitalized Lower Manhattan office market. 
4. Cost of 9/11 Attack versus Economic Impacts of Redevelopment 
A 2002 study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic and Policy 
Review estimate the total losses from the 9/11 attacks including earning losses, property 
damage, and cleanup to be between $33 and $36 billion.185 Of those losses, the physical 
losses shown in Figure 23 total $21.6 billion. 
 
                                                 
183 Rey Mashayekhi, “Class A Rents in Midtown Rebound; Midtown South Sees ‘Hitch’” The Real 
Deal – New York Real Estate News, May 1, 2015, http://therealdeal.com/blog/2015/05/01/class-a-rents-in-
midtown-rebound-while-midtown-south-sees-hitch/. 
184 Mashayekhi, “Class A Rents in Midtown Rebound; Midtown South Sees ‘Hitch.’” 
185 Bram, Orr, and Raraport, “Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New York City.”  
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Figure 23.  Measuring the Effects of the September 11, 2001 Attack  
on New York City 
 
From Jason Bram, James Orr, and Carol Raraport, “Measuring the Effects of the 
September 11 Attack on New York City,” FRBNY Economic Policy Review, November 
1, 2002, http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/02v08n2/0211rapa.pdf. 
While the loss totals appear to be staggering, they are dwarfed by the positive 
economic impacts of the redevelopment, which were estimated to be $15.7 billion 
annually (direct, indirect, and inducted) in a study produced for the Lower Manhattan 
Development Corporation, as shown in Figure 24.186  
Figure 24.  Economic Impact of Redeveloping the World Trade Center Site 
 
From Appleseed, Economic Impact of Redeveloping The World Trade Center Site: New 
York City, New York State, And the New York—New Jersey Area (New York: 
Appleseed, 2003), http://www.renewnyc.org/content/pdfs/Appleseed.pdf. 
                                                 
186 Appleseed, Economic Impact of Redeveloping The World Trade Center Site: New York City, New 




The loss of the life at the original WTC was a tragic event but with it, the sudden 
disappearance of the original WTC buildings caused a significant decrease in total 
square-footage of available office space, which served to stabilize an oversaturated and 
declining commercial real estate market in Lower Manhattan. Through public and private 
investment, the new WTC has been constructed to be more efficient in design that meets 
the office market demands of premium clientele in Manhattan. The smaller but more 
luxurious office footprint draws nearly double the price per square-foot and provides 
more retail, transit, cultural, and public spaces for the general consumer.  
The $21.6 billion estimate of the capital losses187 ($16.4 in physical buildings) 
associated with the 9/11 attack only represent direct losses impacting the WTC itself. CI 
is defined by the interconnectivity of the systems within each sector and across multiple 
sectors. Manhattan has an estimated $804.4 billion office market188 with 32.8 million 
square-feet of office space. Compared to the overall office market, the loss of the WTC 
represented 2% of the total commercial office building value while also being 29% of 
total office space (in an oversaturated market). In addition to stabilizing the office leasing 
market, redevelopment has transformed the mid-1990s Lower Manhattan, which did not 
offer premier real estate, luxury shopping, world class hotels, destination dining, and 
tourism, into an area that produces cumulative consumer spending of $5.2 billion 
annually according to the 2014 Lower Manhattan Real Estate Market Overview produced 
by the Alliance for Downtown New York.189 
                                                 
187 Appleseed, Economic Impact of Redeveloping The World Trade Center Site: New York City, New 
York State, And the New York—New Jersey Area. 
188 New York City Department of Finance, Tentative Assessment Roll: Fiscal Year 2008 (New York: 
Department of Finance, 2007), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/finance/downloads/pdf/07pdf/assessment_re 
port_08.pdf.  
189 Alliance for Downtown New York, Inc., Lower Manhattan Real Estate Market Overview 2014 
(New York: Alliance for Downtown New York, Inc., 2014), http://www.downtownny.com/sites/default/ 
files/Q2%202014%20FINAL%20REPORT.pdf. 
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6. Impact to Critical Infrastructure Definition 
The 2006 Homeland Security Advisory Council—Report on Critical 
Infrastructure Task Force reported that the impacts of terrorism and 9/11 extended “well 
beyond the direct ‘ground zero effects’ and were exacerbated by citizens’ choices based 
on their altered perception of risk. Ultimately, the ability of CI to full recover from a 
catastrophe depends on the actions of the consumers.”190 The exact “ground zero” 
location of the 9/11 attack has become a tourism destination of itself. The 110,000-
square-foot National September 11 Memorial Museum was initially expected to draw 2.5 
million visitors per year but exceeded 500,000 visitors during the first two months of 
operation in May and June 2014.191 The number of hotel rooms in Lower Manhattan near 
the location of the attacks has tripled since 2001, which demonstrates significant interest 
as a destination for tourists (Figure 25). 
Figure 25.  Number of Hotel Rooms in Lower Manhattan 
 
From Alliance for Downtown New York, Inc., Lower Manhattan Real Estate Market 
Overview 2014 (New York: Alliance for Downtown New York, Inc., 2014), http://www. 
downtownny.com/sites/default/files/Q2%202014%20FINAL%20REPORT.pdf. 
                                                 
190 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Report of the Critical Infrastructure Task Force 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2006), 6, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSAC_ 
CITF_Report_v2.pdf. 
191 Alliance for Downtown New York, Inc., Lower Manhattan Real Estate Market Overview 2014. 
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The loss of the original WTC is a case that is opposite to the principles of a 
facility being “critical infrastructure.” Rather than causing debilitating and cascading 
negative impacts to the nation or surrounding region, the loss of the buildings was a net-
positive to the components of the CF sector in Lower Manhattan. It is unlikely a viable 
plan would have been available to demolish and rebuild the WTC without an unplanned 
event destroying it. Without the 9/11 attack, the continued existence of the original Twin 
Towers would have resulted in sustained over-saturation of the Manhattan office market 
with an excess amount of outdated and undesirable Class B office space. Over the past 
decade, the office market pressure has continued to grow for LEED Certified and Green 
Office space, which would have continued to decrease the price per square-foot at the 
WTC as surrounding buildings drew away Class A customers.192 The enormous amount 
of office space within the original Twin Towers would have likely continued to depress 
the surrounding market and economic growth, and deter capital investment into the area. 
The original WTC buildings, and CF in general, should not be considered “critical 
infrastructure” because commercial markets are too complex with numerous contributing 
variables for DHS or a group of industry representatives to make assumptions that 
individual facilities are supremely important. It is very unlikely that anyone would have 
said the largest building in New York City was not critical, but the destruction of it paved 
the way for massive redevelopment and economic growth, as seen in Figure 26. 
Figure 26.  Advertising Materials for the new 1 World Trade Center Building 
 
From “Home: World Trade Center,” accessed July 23, 2015, https://www.wtc.com/.  
                                                 
192 “The Business Case for Green Building,” accessed July 23, 2015, http://www.usgbc.org/articles/ 
business-case-green-building.  
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Figure 27.  1 World Trade Center website 
 
From “One World Trade Center,” accessed July 23, 2015, http://www.greenbuildingsnyc. 
com/?page=121&cat=36.  
B. CASE STUDY: LAS VEGAS CASINOS AND CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Assets assigned DHS with the responsibility to  
develop a uniform methodology for identifying facilities, systems, and 
functions with national-level criticality to help establish protection 
priorities; build a comprehensive database to catalog these facilities, 
systems, and functions; and maintain a comprehensive, up-to-date 
assessment of vulnerabilities and preparedness across critical sectors.193  
                                                 
193 Moteff, Copeland, and Fischer, Critical Infrastructures: What Makes an Infrastructure Critical?. 
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Below the national level, DHS’s Regional Resiliency Assessment Program evaluates 
clusters of CI and key resources with a geographic area. 
In a regional geographic area, jurisdictions have different interpretations of the 
types of facilities critical to their jurisdiction, to the larger region and the nation. In Clark 
County, NV, 
the protection of the Nation’s infrastructure assets (or “critical 
infrastructure”) from disruption and destruction is a primary function and 
concern of all levels of government. Clark County, internationally known 
for the Las Vegas Strip and lavish casino entertainment, is unique in that 
the structure of the local economy is built primarily on gaming. In the 
evaluation of critical assets in Las Vegas, Nevada, the most important 
assets are clearly the casinos and glitter of the Strip.194  
President Policy Direction/PPD-21 defined CI as the “systems and assets, 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health and safety, or any combination of those matters.”195 The 
Clark County: Critical Infrastructure and Key Asset report describes the international and 
nation significance of Las Vegas and The Strip’s casinos as the most critical assets, but 
are these CF even critical at the local level? See Figure 28. 
  
                                                 
194 Urban Environmental Research, LLC, Clark County: Critical Infrastructure & Key Assets Final 
(Clark County, NV: Urban Environmental Research, LLC, 2008, http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/Depts/ 
comprehensive_planning/nuclear_waste/Documents/Studies/CCCriticalInfrastructure0508.pdf.  
195 The White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 
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Figure 28.  Image of the “Fabled” Riviera Casino That Closed on May 4, 2015 
 
From Brandon Griggs, “Fabled Las Vegas Casino Closes after 60 Years,” CNN, May 5 
2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/05/travel/riviera-hotel-casino-vegas-closes-feat/. 
1. What Gaming Facilities Subsector Members Expect from DHS 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Commercial Facilities Sector—
Annex 2: Gaming Facilities Subsector describes the facilities in the sector as soft targets 
vulnerable to the public’s fear and perceptions of security. To protect casinos from 
potential terrorist attacks, the costs of making physical changes are significant and a need 
exists for tax incentives to reduce the economic burden on owners for making 
improvements. The goal of the subsector is to “implement security measures that are 
efficient, cost-effective, and as unobtrusive as possible.”196 Across the gaming subsector, 
facilities have “expressed concerns over sharing assessment information with the Federal 
                                                 
196 Department of Homeland Security, Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan an Annex to the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2010, 81. 
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Government for any initiative that makes formal decisions on the prioritization of assets 
(e.g., concluding that one asset is more ‘at risk’ than another).”197 
The gaming subsector cites $5.6 billion in direct gaming tax revenue198 as the 
justification for federal resources and protection as CI facilities, but the requests of the 
subsector council include tax incentives, which would reduce this revenue. To distribute 
resources across 445 facilities effectively, DHS must make a determination of risk, 
priority, and criticality but the gaming subsector also does not support any effort to 
document one facility as more important than others. 
2. Las Vegas Casinos 
In planning for protection of a CI facility, such as a Las Vegas casino, protective 
measures would address the use of explosives by terrorists to damage or destroy the 
building. Since the economic depression in 2006, explosives have destroyed many of The 
Strip’s “critical” casinos but these explosives were planned detonations to implode vacant 
buildings intentionally. Since 2006, the Castaway, Boardwalk, Bourbon Street, Stardust, 
New Frontier, and Klondike casinos have all been imploded. During the same time 
period, the Lady Luck, Sahara, Western, O’Shea’s, Gold Spike, and Riviera casinos have 
all closed.199 The implosion of six casinos and the closure of six others over the last 
decade means that 12 of Las Vegas’ 87 casinos (currently 75 are open), or 14%, of these 
CI facilities have been lost.200 The loss of a critical facility should result in debilitating 
impacts to the nation, so how has the loss of 12 critical facilities impacted the local area 
in Las Vegas? 
From 2005 to 2013, the population of Las Vegas has increased from 544,608 to 
603,448 (Figure 29). Real per capital income increased slightly from 2005–2007 before 
dipping to 15% lower than pre-casino closures at $25,918 in 2013 (Figure 30). 
                                                 
197 Department of Homeland Security, Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan an Annex to the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2010, 83. 
198 Ibid. 
199 “Yet Another Las Vegas Casino History Timeline,” accessed July 23, 2015 http://www.lvrevealed. 
com/deathwatch/las_vegas_timeline.html.  
200 “Complete List of Las Vegas Casinos,” February 1, 2015, http://vegasclick.com/vegas/casinos.  
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Residential rental rates have remained fairly constant over the same time period (Figure 
31). 
Figure 29.  Population of Las Vegas, NV, by Year 
 
From U.S. Census Bureau, “Public Data from U.S. Census Bureau,” Google.com, 





Figure 30.  Nevada Real Per Capita Income per Year 
 
From “Las Vegas-Paradise Nevada Household Income,” accessed July 23, 2015, http:// 
www.deptofnumbers.com/income/nevada/las-vegas/.  
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Figure 31.  Monthly Rental Rates in Las Vegas by Year 
 
From “Las Vegas-Paradise Nevada Rent and Rental Statistics,” accessed July 23, 2015, 
http://www.deptofnumbers.com/rent/nevada/las-vegas/. 
In Las Vegas, the casinos are considered to be critical facilities, which would 
result in debilitating impacts to the local economy if they were destroyed, but as 14% of 
the casinos were imploded or closed, the population of the city increased while median 
rental prices and incomes remained fairly constant. 
The casinos that have closed permanently or been demolished in Las Vegas had 
previously been cornerstones of The Strip. The most recent facility to close is the Riviera 
Hotel and Casino, which was the first high-rise, built in the area in 1955, and included 
2,100 hotel rooms. The hotel featured A-list celebrity guests, professional boxing title 
fights, and performers including Elvis Presley and Louis Armstrong.201 While 1,200 
employees at the Riviera lost their jobs, more than 950,000 of 1,029,700202 employable 
people in Las Vegas remain employed maintaining an unemployment rate of 7.2%, which 
is just over the national average of 5.4%.203  
                                                 
201 Brandon Griggs, “Fabled Las Vegas Casino Closes after 60 Years,” CNN, May 5, 2015, http:// 
www.cnn.com/2015/05/05/travel/riviera-hotel-casino-vegas-closes-feat/. 
202 “Las Vegas-Paradise, NV Economy at a Glance,” July 21, 2015. http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag. 
nv_lasvegas_msa.htm.  
203 “National Employment Monthly Update,” July 2, 2015, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-
employment/national-employment-monthly-update.aspx.  
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If the loss of “critical infrastructure” casinos in Las Vegas did not result in 
widespread detrimental impacts to the city, should these facilities be considered to be 
“critical infrastructure” to Clark County, NV? If the impacts of the closures were 
negligible at the local level, it is unlikely that these casinos have any regional or national 
implications to CI. 
3. Resiliency within the Las Vegas Casino Industry 
While the Clark County: Critical Infrastructure and Key Asset report describes 
The Strip’s casinos as the most critical assets, it is not the individual physical properties 
that are critical, it is the overall gaming industry that is essential to the city. The 
individual properties are not critical, as shown by the 12 casinos closed between 2006 
and 2015 without causing major disruptions to the tourism industry (Figure 33), hotel 
occupancy (Figure 33), or gaming revenue (Figure 32). When DHS determines how to 
spend federal funding for providing protection to CI, not a single casino needs protective 
measures, and it would be prohibitively expensive to protect every casino against all 
threats. In a terrorist attack scenario, simultaneously destroying all 80 casinos on the Las 
Vegas Strip would be the largest terrorist attack in world history, and is very unlikely to 
occur. The gaming industry in Las Vegas is already “protected” by the resiliency within 
the network of eight casinos along The Strip. An attack against a single casino, or group 
of casinos, would not cause the entire gaming industry to crumble because the loss of 12 
casinos to closure has not significantly impacted key indicators (visitors, hotel 
occupancy, and tax revenue). An attack across the entire industry is not realistic. In other 
words, the protection of the key asset (gaming industry) already exists within the current 
system without additional assistance from federal funding and resources. 
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Figure 32.  Annual Tax Revenue of Las Vegas Strip Casinos 2001–2012 via 
University of Las Vegas Center for Gaming Research 
 
From David G. Schwartz, Major Gaming Jurisdiction: Twelve-Year Comparison (Las 
Vegas: Center for Gaming Research, University Libraries, University of Nevada Las 
Vegas, 2013), http://gaming.unlv.edu/reports/12_year_comp.pdf. 
Figure 33.  Las Vegas Visitor Statistics from  
Visitor and Convention Authority 
 
From “Historical Las Vegas Visitor Statistics,” February 1, 2015, http://www.lvcva. 
com/stats-and-facts/.  
The Clark County: Critical Infrastructure and Key Asset report also describes that 
a terrorist attack would deter visitors from traveling to Las Vegas, which would be 
extremely detrimental to the hotel and gaming industry. Following the 9/11 attacks in 
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New York City, annual tourism has increased every calendar year since 2001. In 2013, 
54.3 million people visited New York City, which is 16 million more than 2000 (36.2 
million).204 The exact site of the terrorist attack has also drawn 19 million visitors to the 
9/11 Memorial since it opened in 2011, which suggests that a terrorist attack occurring at 
a facility is not necessarily a deterrence for future visitors. Furthermore, a memorial for 
the attack may become a tourist destination in itself.  
4. Individual Gaming Facilities Are Not Critical Infrastructure 
At the federal level, the gaming facilities subsector uses total gross revenue and 
tax revenue as the justification for the inclusion of casinos as CI. The DHS gaming 
subsector also does not identify individual facilities as being more or less critical than 
other gaming facilities. Choosing not to delineate importance (based on revenue, 
economic impact, tax base, population, or any other measure) aligns with the concept of 
the resiliency that has been demonstrated across the Las Vegas Strip casinos. No 
individual casino in the country has significant impacts at the gaming industry at the 
local, regional, or national level. A network of hundreds of gaming facilities provides a 
variety of gambling options even if specific locations are unavailable due to business 
closure, a terrorist attack, or any other reason. This resiliency within the gaming 
subsector buffers disruptions and allows for a steady generation of revenue without the 
need for federal resources to be dedicated to the protection of specific gaming facilities. 
C. CASE STUDY: SCARCITY OF FUNCTION AND A SINGLE POINT OF 
FAILURE FOR CHARLESTON, WV WATER SUPPLY 
Clean water is essential to human survival across the world. A mix of public and 
private utility providers provide water services in the United States, and protection of 
these critical services falls under the DHS CI water sector. Loss of water services causes 
both an immediate risk to human health and cascading impacts across other CI sectors 
dependent on water services.205 Prioritizing the protection of water infrastructure on the 
                                                 
204 “NYC Statistics,” accessed July 23, 2015, http://www.nycgo.com/articles/nyc-statistics-page.  
205 Department of Homeland Security, Water Sector-Specific Plan An Annex to the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2010), 13, https:// 
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nationwide level is described in the 2010 NIPP Water Sector Specific Plan through the 
evaluation of “higher-consequence and higher-priority utilities. Four criteria are used to 
better identify these national level high-consequence assets: (1) population served; (2) 
amount of chlorine gas stored on site; (3) economic impact; and (4) critical customers 
served.”206 
In January 2014, a toxic chemical spill of 10,000 gallons of 4-
methylcyclohexanemethonol contaminated the Elk River one and half miles upstream of 
the City of Charleston in West Virginia. This spill resulted in the total contamination of 
water services (drinking, washing, bathing) to 300,000 residents in nine counties.207 
Public water utility service was the primary source of water for the majority of the 
residents in the area:  
 17.6% of residents reported having rainwater and 5.6% reported well 
water available, which resulted in the majority of residents requiring 
bottled water because tap water was not available.  
 37% of residents reported using tap water during the “do not use” order, 
which showed that adequate supplies of bottled water were not available 
for all water related activities including showering/bathing  
 78.8% of users during restriction showered/bathed with contaminated 
water.208 
The chemical spill into the Elk River is an example of both a scarcity of function 
and a single point of failure in an infrastructure system. Municipal water service was the 
primary provider of clean water (an essential-to-life service) for the residents of 
Charleston and the surrounding counties. Without the municipal water service, a scarcity 
                                                 
206 Department of Homeland Security, Water Sector-Specific Plan An Annex to the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 13. 
207 West Virginia Bureau for Public Health (WVBPH) and the Agency for Toxic Substances Disease 
Registry, Elk River Chemical Spill Health Effects Findings of Emergency Department Record Review April 
2014 Collaborative Investigation by the West Virginia Bureau for Public Health (WVBPH) and the Agency 
for Toxic Substances Disease Registry (ATSDR) (West Virginia: Department of Health & Human 
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208 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Disaster Response and Recovery Needs of 
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of function occurred because other sources were unable to provide adequate supplies of 
the necessary service to the population. The upstream contamination represented a single 
point of failure in the water service system because no alternate source was available 
from which the water treatment facility and water system could draw. The chemical spill 
into the sole water supply for the majority of citizens caused the entire water service 
infrastructure to fail. 
This failure of the water infrastructure system is an example of a CI system 
critical to the local jurisdiction. The lack of water services in an isolated area was not 
regionally or nationally significant to water infrastructure systems. The lack of water to 
this isolated area was also not debilitating to the region or the nation. This example is 
useful for studying scarcity of function and single points of failure in a CI system. 
Currently, DHS measures the consequences of loss of water services by 
evaluating the public health effects, economic impacts, psychological impacts, and 
interdependencies and dependencies with other infrastructure sectors.209 It seems more 
useful to evaluate the criticality of water systems through the scarcity of the water 
infrastructure function and the existence of a single point of failure in delivery of the 
service. At a local and regional level, resiliency in the delivery of essential services exists 
across infrastructure sectors. In the West Virginia chemical spill, regional and national 
systems provided bottled and trucked water in an effective manner to meet service 
demands. 
The Charleston outage is useful for evaluating the loss of single sources of 
essential functions at the national level. The Hoover Dam is the sole provider for 
providing water serves to 1.3 million citizens.210 The Hoover Dam also holds back a 9.2 
trillion gallon211 reservoir that would require million gallons of a toxic chemical to 
contaminate. In West Virginia, the mining industry positioned 10,000 gallons of a 
                                                 
209 Department of Homeland Security, Water Sector-Specific Plan An Annex to the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 25. 
210 “Hoover Dam—Frequent Asked Questions,” March 12, 2015, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/hoover 
dam/faqs/damfaqs.html.  
211 “Hoover Dam and Powerplant,” September 2013, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/brochures/ 
hoover.html.  
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dangerous chemical near a waterway but no million-gallon storage tanks of toxic 
chemicals are positioned directly around the Hoover Dam. It is also not a viable scenario 
for a terrorist group, or other enemy, to transport millions of gallons of a toxic chemical 
to a nationally significant water source. It would take 20,000 tractor-trailer trucks 
carrying 5,000 gallons of a chemical to amass one million gallons of a contaminant. Even 
if the Hoover Dam were somehow contaminated with a chemical, it would likely have 
minimal impact on its ability to generate four billion kilowatts of power,212 and the 
subsequent functions of other infrastructure sectors dependent on it for water. 
Figure 34.  Interdependencies with Water Sector Infrastructure from National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan 
 
From Department of Homeland Security, Water Sector-Specific Plan An Annex to the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2010), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-water-2010.pdf. 
On the national level, do sole providers and single points of failure exist in CI 
systems and services? If they do exist, how large is the scale of the disruption needed to 
                                                 
212 “Hoover Dam—Frequent Asked Questions.” 
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break the system (example: What volume of toxic chemicals would be needed to 
contaminate the Hetch Hetchy Water System that serves 1.7 million citizens213 in San 
Francisco, CA? Would an accidental or intentional release of that volume of chemicals be 
viable? It is likely not a viable scenario?). In the local case of the Charleston spill, water 
for drinking, cooking, and bathing was impacted but did the contamination have any 
impact on other infrastructure systems, such as electrical power, telecommunications, 
transportation, petroleum liquid, or natural gas as shown in Figure 34 from the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan? A drinking water outage is not necessarily an outage of 
all water uses across every infrastructure function that uses water as a component of 
providing its function. 
  
                                                 
213 “Hetch Hetchy Water System,” accessed July 23, 2015, http://bawsca.org/water-supply/hetch-
hetchy-water-system/.  
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VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
DHS can simplify the statutory IP mission by removing the designation of 
“critical” from facilities not essential to the health and safety of the public and the 
economic security of the nation. Many facilities currently deemed critical are likely not 
even critical to the region and locality that they serve as shown by the case studies of 
New York, Las Vegas, and Charleston, WV. To identify facilities more effectively that 
are CI, DHS should consider a risk-based approach within a more narrow definition of CI 
modeled after best practices from the United Kingdom. DHS should also reexamine why 
infrastructure facilities have been designated to be primary targets for terrorism. CI 
protection policy should not be focused on large-scale attacks to CI facilities when they 
have not been the target of the largest domestic terrorist attacks and were rarely the target 
of the 130,000 terrorist attacks across the world over the last 50 years.  
DHS is required to manage risks to CI by the NIPP, PPD-21, and the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 but “DHS is not positioned to manage an integrated and coordinated 
government-wide approach for CI vulnerability assessment activities as called for by the 
NIPP.”214 A remedy for this problem is reducing the overall number of facilities across 
the 16 CI sectors. Removing the low-risk and non-critical facilities can simplify the 
overall task by reducing the total number of locations, and the subsequent time and 
resources needed to conduct assessments, plans, sector outreach, working group meeting, 
and national-level program management. Each of these actions would be easier to 
accomplish with a smaller number of CI facilities to assess. 
While the 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan provides a supplemental 
tool for executing a risk management approach, the methodology is too broad because it 
can apply to “all threats and hazards, including cyber incidents, natural disasters, man-
made safety hazards, and active of terrorism, although different information and 
                                                 
214 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection DHS Action Needed to 
Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts, 37. 
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methodologies may be used to understand each.”215 While a national plan should have a 
specific strategy, the NIPP “goals and objectives are likely to vary across sectors and 
organizations depending on the risk landscape, operating environment, and composition 
of a specific industry, resource, or other aspect of critical infrastructure.”216 The plan 
states the importance of measuring effectiveness but the end state and performance 
metrics are undefined. Adopting a more focused risk-based approach, such as the 
methods used by the United Kingdom, can assist DHS in evaluating if terrorism is the 
primary risk to a facility. 
A. RECOMMENDATION: FOLLOW BEST PRACTICES FROM ANALYSIS 
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
POLICY 
Key similarities allow for a comparison of the U.S.’s and the UK’s CI policies. 
Both countries view the protection of CI as a national security priority because the loss of 
CI facilities or systems would cause devastating impacts to the safety and health of the 
public, economy, and the overall well-being of the country. 
The UK’s definition of CI is more refined in describing both the core term and 
definition. Rather than just “critical infrastructure,” the United Kingdom uses the term 
“national infrastructure” to emphasize the scope of the mission, which is focused on 
facilities impacting the entire nation. The United Kingdom defines national infrastructure 
as “facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the functioning of the country and 
the delivery of the essential services upon which daily life in the UK depends.”217 The 
definition makes it clear that national infrastructure is exclusively the systems that the 
entire country is dependent on for daily life. It can be a best practice adopted by the 
United States. Both the United States and the United Kingdom understand facilities and 
systems that provide vital services to the country need to be protected against natural 
                                                 
215 Department of Homeland Security, Supplemental Tool: Executing a Critical Infrastructure Risk 
Management Approach. 
216 Ibid. 
217 “About: The National Infrastructure,” accessed July 23, 2015, http://www.cpni.gov.uk/about/cni/. 
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disasters and terrorist attacks. Both countries designate these facilities and systems as 
“critical infrastructure.”  
B. HOW THE UNITED KINGDOM IS PROTECTING INFRASTRUCTURE 
Since the resources needed to protect infrastructure assets are limited, and 
vulnerabilities at every facility are unequal, a way needs to be created to prioritize 
facilities to guide the protection mission. The United Kingdom uses a risk-based system 
for prioritizing infrastructure, as shown in Figure 35.  
Figure 35.  Using a Risk-Based Approach to Prioritize  
Sector Resilience Planning 
 
From Cabinet Office, Strategic Framework and Policy Statement on Improving the 
Resilience of Critical Infrastructure to Disruption from Natural Hazards (United 
Kingdom: Cabinet Office, 2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/strategic-
framework-and-policy-statement-on-improving-the-resilience-of-critical-infrastructure-
to-disruption-from-natural-hazards. 
When assessing risks to CI, the United Kingdom evaluates the likelihood of 
something happening in the next five years, and the consequences or impacts that people 
will feel if it does occur.218 After determining the risk, the consequence is measured on a 
                                                 
218 Cabinet Office, Strategic Framework and Policy Statement on Improving the Resilience of Critical 




0–5 scale based on the number of fatalities, illness/injury caused, social disruptions, 
economic harm, and psychological impact.219 A matrix allows for infrastructure assets to 
be plotted based on criticality to the nation and the assessment of likelihood from 
combining vulnerability and existence of a threat. For an infrastructure asset to be 
considered high priority, both a high level of criticality and a high likelihood of 
something occurring must be demonstrated. 
This risk-based approach is used for both the prioritization of facilities and 
evaluation of security threats. As Figure 36 depicts, the highest priority attacks would be 
displayed in the upper right while the lowest priorities would fall in the low left due to 
low plausibility of occurring and low impact scores. The matrix-based risk assessment 
allows senior leaders and planners to decide objectively how they want to address risks. 
A senior leader who is most concerned with high impact/consequence attacks, would be 
able to look at the matrix and decide, “catastrophic terrorist attacks” are the areas to 
which resources should be allocated. If a senior leader wants to dedicate resources to the 
highest likelihood of attack, “attacks on transportation systems” and “cyber-attacks” 
would be the priority. This type of objective analysis of risk allows a senior official to 
make informed decisions.  
  
                                                 
219 Cabinet Office, Strategic Framework and Policy Statement on Improving the Resilience of Critical 
Infrastructure to Disruption from Natural Hazards (United Kingdom: Cabinet Office, 2010), 4. 
 103
Figure 36.  Risks of Terrorist and Other Malicious Attacks 
 
From Cabinet Office, Strategic Framework and Policy Statement on Improving the 
Resilience of Critical Infrastructure to Disruption from Natural Hazards (United 
Kingdom: Cabinet Office, 2010), 10, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ 
strategic-framework-and-policy-statement-on-improving-the-resilience-of-critical-infra 
structure-to-disruption-from-natural-hazards. 
Table 5 shows the similarities and differences between the infrastructure sectors 








Table 5.   Comparison of U.S. and U.K. Infrastructure Sectors 
U.S. Critical Infrastructure Sectors220 U.K. National Infrastructure221  
Chemical*  
Commercial Facilities*  
Communications Communications 
Critical Manufacturing*  
Dams*  
Defense Industrial Base*  
Emergency Services Emergency Services 
Energy Energy 
Financial Services Financial services 
Food and Agriculture Food 
Government Facilities Government 
Health Care and Public Health Health 
Information Technology  
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste*  
Transportation Systems Transport 
Water and Wastewater Systems Water 
*Privately owned and operated 
 
While the GAO report highlights the issues DHS is having with prioritizing CI 
protection, the United Kingdom addresses the problem of determining what is critical or 
non-critical by using a risk-based approach for evaluating facilities within the 
infrastructure sectors. Not everything within a national infrastructure sector is critical. 
Within the sectors are certain critical elements of infrastructure, “the loss or compromise 
of which would have a major detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of 
essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of 
life.”222 These critical assets make up the nation’s critical national infrastructure (CNI) 
and are referred to individually as “infrastructure assets.” Infrastructure assets may be 
physical (e.g., sites, installations, pieces of equipment) or logical (e.g., information 
networks, systems).223 
                                                 
220 “Critical Infrastructure Sectors.” 
221 “About: The National Infrastructure.” 
222 “About: The National Infrastructure.” 
223 Ibid. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY REVISION 
While U.S. CI policies allow for broad inclusiveness of facilities within the 
sectors, the United Kingdom makes a clear designation that the loss of the infrastructure 
asset must have a major detrimental impact to the country. The United Kingdom uses a 
risk-based approach to determine how resources will be allocated and protection of 
facilities will be prioritized. The United States should adopt a similar risk-based approach 
that establishes values for prioritization of critical facilities based on criticality, 
vulnerability, and threat. By using a risk-based matrix to evaluate current CI sectors, the 
United States could realign the current 16 CI sectors to match the nine used by the United 
Kingdom. Reducing the total number of infrastructure sectors would simplify the overall 
protection mission because each sector would have its own dedicated DHS staff, 
reporting requirements, resource allocation, supporting federal agencies, and performance 
metrics. 
The United States could reduce the number of CI sectors by removing the sectors 
owned, operated, and protected by the private sector (CF sector, chemical, and critical 
manufacturing). Individual facilities within these sectors are unlikely to cause 
catastrophic national impacts if they are destroyed or inoperable. These facilities also do 
not meet the UK’s definition of national infrastructure.  
Along the same lines, “information technology” is a nebulous term for 
designating a sector as critical and is not a term used by the United Kingdom for national 
infrastructure. The sector is defined as the “virtual and distributed functions produce and 
provide hardware, software, and information technology systems and services, and—in 
collaboration with the Communications Sector—the Internet.”224 These systems or 
components are unlikely to cause catastrophic damages to the entire nation if they are in 
operable, which makes the designation of CI unnecessary. The systems critical to 
communication can be addressed under the responsibilities of the communications sector. 
                                                 
224 “Information Technology Sector,” June 12, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/information-technology-
sector.  
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Accordingly, “nuclear reactors” do not need to be a separate CI sector from 
“energy,” which would also align with the UK national infrastructure designations. The 
energy produced by a nuclear power plant is critical to the U.S. electric power system. It 
is unlikely that a nuclear power plant not currently producing power would cause 
catastrophic consequences if it was attacked or damaged by a natural disaster. The 
protection of large quantities of nuclear material is likely a separate national security 
mission that would be carried out by DOD, the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission rather than being designated a CI protection mission under the 
authority of DHS. 
Beyond just looking at damage or the loss of infrastructure assets, the term 
“resilience” is instrumental to UK CI protection. The Cabinet Office defines resilience as 
the ability to absorb, respond to, and recover from emergencies.225 When facilities are 
damaged by a disaster or attack, if the facility provides a critical function, a resilient 
facility may be able to continue to function or be minimally disrupted. 
In the publically available annual Sector Resilience Plans, the Cabinet Office 
provides information about the hazards/threats to each of the nine sectors. The report also 
provides a summary of the existing level of resilience to address the hazards/threats and 
actionable recommendations for increasing resilience. For example, in the 2014 plan, the 
food sector highlights its risk as a “widespread dependency on other essential services, 
such as fuel.” The resilience of the sector is demonstrated by the ability to “continue to 
operate at or near to capacity despite the severe winter weather and flooding events 
experience from 2010 through to early 2014,” and the sector can be strengthened by 
“government sponsored research looking at the resilience of the food supply chain to port 
disruption and pinch points created by potential fuel disruptions.”226 Publishing policies 
for addressing current risk and conducting future planning to mitigate further risk is a 
transparent method of addressing shortfalls, while acknowledging the efforts to make CI 
assets more resilient.  
                                                 
225 “Emergency Planning,” accessed July 23, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/emer 
gency-planning.  
226 “A Summary of the 2014 Sector Resilience Plans,” August 1, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/govern 
ment/collections/sector-resilience-plans.  
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The United Kingdom publishes annual public reports that highlight successes and 
shortfalls across each of the infrastructure sectors without compromising sensitive 
information or pointing blame. DHS should adopt this transparent method of informing 
the public and governmental stakeholders about the status of accomplishing the IP 
mission. The negative findings of the 2012 GAO report would likely not have occurred if 
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VII. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on this research, very few facilities are critical to the nation. The nationally 
significant facilities are likely too large or too secure for a terrorist group to destroy, and 
also not aligned with the targets of previous attacks. On a local and regional level, 
redundancy and resiliency occur across infrastructure systems that allow affected areas to 
absorb outages and unaffected areas to provide alternative services. As a backstop, 
national capabilities can quickly deliver essential services during outages, such as the 
bottled water supplied to Charleston, WV following the chemical spill. Also, the 
enormous complexity within the infrastructure systems makes predicting the impacts of 
outages extremely difficult, as demonstrated by the unanticipated economic gains in 
Lower Manhattan following the 9/11 attacks. The destruction of supposedly critical 
facilities has demonstrated that greater resilience does occur across infrastructure systems 
than DHS generally assumes. Instead of focusing protection efforts on potential losses, 
greater value may be found in understanding existing resiliency.   
A. FINDINGS 
This research examined the federal IP policies that have been issued over the past 
35 years to determine the origin and evolution of the mission. Within these documents, a 
consensus can be drawn that the definition of the term “critical infrastructure” is the 
systems and assets nationally significant and the loss of which would result in debilitating 
consequences to the safety and security of the United States. The 10 overarching CI 
policies227 released over the past 19 years consistently describe CI as being nationally 
significant, providing vital services, being part of an interconnected system, causing 
debilitating impacts if destroyed, and providing a service necessary to the health and 
safety of the general public.  
Based on the analysis, infrastructure that lacks national significance, criticality, 
and interconnectedness to other infrastructure systems does not meet this definition. As a 
                                                 
227 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, NIPP, PPD-21, Exec. Order No. 13636, NIPP, National 
Security Strategy, HSPD-7, USA PATRIOT Act, PDD/NSC-63, and Exec. Order No. 13010. 
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result, a discrepancy occurs between the federal policies that define CI and how DHS 
currently addresses its statutory IP mission to identify, prioritize, and protect the nation’s 
most vital infrastructure.228 
A problem with the current policies is that many of the facilities currently 
designated as critical do not meet the consensus definition identified in the literature 
review but are still considered to be “critical infrastructure.” This may have stemmed 
from the early directive for the newly formed DHS to develop a list of all of the critical 
facilities across the country.229 This thesis demonstrated challenges DHS has faced from 
the creation of the NADB, the NCIPP, and the ongoing mandate to develop a centralized 
list of CI. 
Modern military theories provide a potential explanation for the focus of DHS’s 
efforts because the threats from terrorism have likely been evaluated based on the 
education and experience of senior officials drawing on their experiences with the 
principles of strategic warfare. Nationally significant infrastructure facilities that can 
cripple the essential functions of the entire country would be attractive targets for an 
enemy nation-state to strike with ballistic missile and airpower capabilities during a war. 
The current terrorist threat comes from homegrown violent extremists and members of 
terrorist groups who are motivated to inflict mass casualties in the locations that are most 
visible and easily accessible.230 An individual terrorist or a small group of terrorists most 
likely lack the intelligence, organizational coordination, manpower, and resources to 
conduct a strategic warfare campaign against nationally significant infrastructure targets 
with the intent of crippling essential-to-life systems across the country. The strategic 
warfare approach of developing a static list of vulnerable assets does not match the 
unpredictable and dynamic threat from terrorism. The current IP policies identify the 
likely targets of a nation-state army and assume them to be the same targets that terrorists 
would have the intention and capability of attacking. 
                                                 
228 The White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.  
229 United States Congress, Committee Reports 109th Congress (2005–2006) House Report 109-713—
Part 1. 
230 “Countering Violent Extremism.” 
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The concept of protecting CI could altogether be a wasted effort because when 
supposedly CI is destroyed, the impacts are often negligible, or in some cases, even 
results in economic gains. Even when terrorists do successfully strike, the consequences 
may be more complex than making a blanket assumption that all CI facilities should be 
protected under all circumstances. Case studies of the WTC and the Las Vegas Strip 
casinos challenge the general assertion that negative economic consequences always 
result from the destruction of a “critical” facility. A case study of the 2014 toxic chemical 
spill into the primary water source serving Charleston, WV provides an example that is 
contrary to the assumption that the loss of a facility serving as a sole provider of an 
essential-to-life service results in cascading, debilitating impacts across all infrastructure 
sectors.  
While it was unforeseeable at the time, the Lower Manhattan area most heavily 
impacted by the 9/11 attacks is more valuable today and better positioned for the future 
than it was prior to 2001. If terrorists cannot cripple this nation by toppling 100-story 
commercial high-rise buildings, what kinds of facilities would have a debilitating impact 
on the entire nation if they were destroyed? Instead of being designated “critical,” the 
majority of infrastructure facilities are insignificant to the functions of the overall system 
because the loss of these facilities does not cause widespread disruptions to the nation, 
region, or even the local area. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence presented within this thesis argued that DHS is not fulfilling the 
mission of protecting the infrastructure that is critical to the nation by expending 
resources on misaligned efforts at thousands of insignificant facilities. These problems 
are rooted in the current scope of the infrastructure mission being too large, but is further 
complicated because the types of facilities designated as critical may not be the likely 
targets of terrorists. The few facilities critical to the nation are most likely are too large, 
too remote, or too secure for a terrorist group to destroy, or to have an interest in 
targeting.  
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On a local and regional level, redundancy and resiliency occurs across 
infrastructure systems that allow affected areas to absorb outages and unaffected areas to 
provide alternative services. As a backstop, national emergency response capabilities can 
quickly deliver essential services during outages, such as the bottled water supplied to 
Charleston, WV following the chemical spill into the water supply. Also, the enormous 
complexity within infrastructure systems makes predicting the impacts of outages 
extremely difficult, as demonstrated by the unanticipated economic gains in Lower 
Manhattan following the 9/11 attacks. 
Based on this thesis, DHS should ensure that everything designated as “critical” 
meets the definition of criticality, that the methodologies used for evaluating 
infrastructure align to the mission of protecting the nation for terrorism, and that 
protection efforts account for the existing resiliency within the systems that provide 
essential-to-life infrastructure across the country.  
Many infrastructure facilities are inconsequential if attacked, and if the loss of a 
facility does not cause the widespread disruptions, it is not CI. DHS should shift from an 
inclusive CI policy that allows facilities to self-designate and self-assess risks to a policy 
that assumes facilities are inconsequential to the security and functions of the nation 
unless proven otherwise. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A solution for accomplishing the task of effectively identifying, prioritizing, and 
protecting CI is refining the criteria for how facilities are determined to be critical. A 
lower number of critical facilities will reduce the overall scope of the protection mission. 
To identify facilities CI more effectively, DHS should consider using a risk-based 
approach within a more narrow definition of the term that can be modeled after best 
practices from the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom uses the designation of 
“national infrastructure” to emphasize the scope of the mission, which is focused 
exclusively on the systems that the entire country is dependent on for daily life. For an 
infrastructure asset to be considered a national priority, both a high level of criticality and 
a high likelihood of something negative occurring must be demonstrated. Adopting a 
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risk-based approach for both prioritization of facilities through the likelihood of 
destruction and evaluation of national impacts can assist DHS in more effectively 
designating facilities as “critical.” 
While infrastructure systems are interdependent, redundancy and resiliency also 
occur, which allow the larger systems to continue functioning during disruptions. 
Resiliency, or the ability of a facility to continue functioning, is the opposite of criticality. 
The ability of resilient systems to resume or continue functioning is the opposite of the 
failures and breakdowns in systems that DHS uses to frame the definitions of CI. This 
concept of resilience follows the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which states, 
“resilient infrastructure systems are flexible and agile and should be able to bounce back 
after disruption.”231 Within the resilient systems, disruptions that occur may cause 
beneficial changes. Policies centered on guarding a vast array of facilities from all types 
of risks potentially have the negative impact of preventing progress at the expense of 
protecting the status quo. 
The 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan operates under the assumption 
that “both domestic and international critical infrastructure assets represent potential 
prime targets for adversaries. Given the deeply rooted nature of these goals and 
motivations, critical infrastructure likely will remain highly attractive targets for state and 
non-state actors and others with ill intent.”232 Based on this research, IP efforts are 
framed under an inaccurate assumption of the terrorist threat to them. CI protection 
policies should not be the focus on large-scale attacks to facilities when they have not 
been the target of the largest domestic terrorist attacks and have rarely been the target of 
the 130,000 terrorist attacks across the world over the last 50 years. Terrorists have not 
previously targeted infrastructure and are unlikely to change their intentions in the future, 
which means that the way DHS views protecting infrastructure and preventing terrorism 
needs to be reformed. 
                                                 




D. OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Additional research into CI failures following the same methodology as the case 
studies within this thesis could determine if negligible losses, or even positive gains, 
occurred in a variety of circumstances. Looking at property values, tourism, tax revenue, 
hotel occupancy, and average rental prices of New Orleans, LA 10 years prior to and 10 
years following Hurricane Katrina would likely show that the post-disaster city has made 
positive economic gains that positions it for a better future. Greensburg, KS was 
completely destroyed by an EF-5 tornado in 2007, but is now known to be a model green 
community because all the buildings have been built to the highest environment 
certification and are wind powered.233 It is unlikely that Greensburg would have become 
a national model of environmental sustainability without the tornado destroying all the 
town’s existing infrastructure. In August 2007, the I-35 bridge over the Mississippi River 
in Minneapolis collapsed and traffic had to be rerouted until the replacement bridge 
opened in September 2008. The bridge would have been considered a critical component 
of the transportation infrastructure but the resiliency within the system allowed for traffic 
to be disrupted rather than a catastrophic failure of the entire system occurring.234 While 
sports stadiums and arenas are infrastructure considered critical to the local or regional 
economy, these facilities have been frequently demolished as facilities age or teams are 
sold then relocated. One example is the KeyArena in Seattle, WA, which housed the 
NBA Seattle SuperSonics from 1967–78, 1985–94, and 1995–2008, but continues to 
function in the interim periods without a team and still provides a venue for various 
forms of sports and entertainment today.235 Across the United States, large shopping 
malls were the hubs of commerce but many are vacant today.236 Many shopping malls 
                                                 
233 “Rebuilding Stronger, Better, Greener!” accessed August 31, 2015, https://www.greensburgks.org/. 
234 “I-35W St. Anthony Falls Bridge,” accessed August 31, 2015, http://www.dot.state.mn.us/i35w 
bridge/collapse.html. 
235 “KeyArena History,” accessed August 31, 2015, http://www.keyarena.com/arena-information/ 
keyarena-history.  
236 Nelson D. Schwartz, “The Economics (and Nostalgia) of Dead Malls,” The New York Times, 
January 4, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/business/the-economics-and-nostalgia-of-dead-
malls.html?_r=0. 
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are considered CI by DHS but has the disappearance of the physical retail infrastructure 
resulted in economic loses to the surrounding areas? 
Also, theoretical concepts should be explored based on the evidence presented 
within this thesis. If infrastructure systems have high levels of resilience and following 
disasters, areas are redeveloped in a more efficient and valuable manner, what would 
happen following a major cyber-attack that crippled the entire national power grid? While 
DHS and the Department of Energy work on strategies to harden the existing grid,237 
would a catastrophic failure result in the creation of a decentralized and sustainable 
energy infrastructure? The seemingly worst-case scenario of losing the existing power 
grid could eventually result in an improved energy delivery system, which would position 
the country for a stronger future. The worst circumstances may spur the greatest 
opportunity for positive change, which could shift homeland security strategies to focus 
primarily on effective recovery rather than on protecting existing systems. 
  
                                                 
237 “Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid,” accessed August 31, 2015, http://www. 
dhs.gov/science-and-technology/csd-tcipg.  
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